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JPRS-KAR-84-054

11 September 1984

Korean Affairs Report

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B1 - CONTROL NUMBER: U300116
B4 - ACCESSION NUMBER:JPRS-KAR-84-054
B3 - COLLECTION CODE: 3
B6 - MANAGEMENT CODE: XR
B7 - PROCESS ACTNG CD: 01 B7A-REGISTRATION FEE: 00000
B8 - PRODUCT MANAGER: H
B9 - RECEIPT TYPE: 1 B9A-LOAN DUE OUT:
B10- TRANSACTION: TN B10A-DUPE/PRIOR/SUPER:
B12- RETURNS: 0 B12A-RETURN DATE:
B13- PROCESSING: 1
B14- PAT. POTENTIAL: 0
B17- FORM/PRICE: 12002 ,
B18- ANNOUNCE: 0000
B19- PUBLICATION-1: U8503 B20- PUBLICATION-2:
B21- LIMITATION: 0
B23- PC BIN: 000
B24- STOCK: 0008 B24A-STOCK TYPE CODES: D
B25- PAGES/SHEETS: 00065
B26- PC PRICE CODE: A04
B27- DOMESTIC PRICE: 0000000 B28- FOREIGN PRICE: 0000000
B29- ACTION CODES: SS
B33- MN PRICE CODE: X00
B34- DOMESTIC PRICE: 0000000 B35- FOREIGN PRICE: 0000000
B36- ACTION CODES: XM
B37- RELEASABILITY CD: A
B38- MF PRINT: D
B39- ADDITIONAL INFO: n
B40- PRINT PC: n
B41- PC DUE: n
B42- SOURCE ORDER: n
B42A-GENERATE RDP: 0
B42B-SUPPLIER SRC CD: n

006)Korean Affairs Report: (11 September 1984). (000
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INTER-KOREAN AFFAIRS

1972 SECRET NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUES REVEALED

Seoul WOLGAN CHOSON in Korean No 7, Jul 84 pp 284-300

[Interview with Chong Hong-chin and Cho Tok-song by Kwon Yong-ki and Mun Hak-chin: "A Midnight Meeting With Kim Il-song"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Part I The People We Met in Pyongyang

Cho Tok-song: This is the 12th anniversary of the 4 July North-South joint statement. It has been a long time, but as an individual I still have many fresh, unforgettable memories about the 4 July 1972 affair. At 10 o'clock that morning the then Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) Director Yi Hu-rak released the statement and held a news conference for about an hour. For 30 minutes beginning at 11 o'clock, I did a solitary commentary regarding the 4 July North-South joint statement on KBS TV.

At any rate, gaining impetus from the joint statement which surprised the people, the North-South Red Cross talks moved from preliminary to main talks while the North-South Coordinating Committee was begun. At the time, I was, at the request of the Korean Red Cross, a member of Red Cross Talks Advisory Committee and in that capacity I participated in four meetings in Pyongyang and three in Seoul until the talks were suspended. Even though I had such personal experiences, both the Red Cross and the Coordinating Committee talks of the 1970's, which derived from the shocking and moving 4 July joint statement, were suspended without having accomplished very much. However, in spite of those frustrations, our side consistently and steadily strove for the normalization and the reopening of the talks.

Now, at this point in time when we are approaching the middle of the 1980's, I feel that it's time to summarize the talks of the 1970's, and in linkage with the talks, the subsequent process. Mr Chong, I know you to be one who literally played a central role in the talks of the 1970's. Please begin by telling us of the background of the 4 July North-South joint statement.

Chong Hong-chin: Rather than talking about the background of the 4 July joint statement, I should talk about how the North-South talks began at our suggestion, about that background. First, you can find the background of the beginning of the North-South talks in the situation around us. The

United States was deeply involved in the war in Vietnam and had moved one division stationed in Korea to Vietnam, and we too were involved in the war in Vietnam. Even so, the Vietnam war was not going in the direction the United States wanted.

As a result, President Nixon was firming up a United States policy of not intervening in political wars, i.e., guerrilla wars or limited war. Nixon's "Guam Doctrine" was the formalization of the idea, "Limited wars are the responsibility of local governments." This Guam Doctrine applies to Korea also. It says that a guerrilla war in Korea is the responsibility of the Korean Government. The United States will intervene only in a full-scale war. Also, the early 1970's was when Ping Pong Diplomacy began the thaw in American-Communist Chinese relations. We need to look at North-South relations within the context of the general flow of such circumstances.

First let us look at North Korea. There was the Cuban crisis in 1962. President Kennedy's strong measures forced the Russians to withdraw their missiles. Seeing that, the North Koreans decided they would have to follow their own military line and came up with their "Four Great Military Lines." They began adding impetus to their war preparations through the strengthening of their military power after 1962. Of course, this doesn't mean that they weren't preparing for war before then. Their 7 year economic plan was extended 3 years past 1970 due to the strengthening of military power. We judged that North Korea had already finished its war preparations by the end of the 1960's. At a time when the international situation was changing with the withdrawal of one American division from Korea and the thawing of American-Communist Chinese relations, North Korea tried to test a guerrilla war with the Songch'u spy incident in 1967, and the 21 January incident and the Ulchin-Samch'ok guerrilla invasion of 1968. We believed that the possibility of a dangerous situation in the Korean Peninsula was growing. Our basic position was that we had to reduce, however slightly, the danger of a renewal of a war like the Korean War.

Our internal situation in the early 1970's was like this. The Third Republic, founded after the 16 May revolution, established through its first and second economic development plans the awareness that, "We, too, can live well if only we work hard." Comparing the economic power of North and South, we were ahead in gross national product, but we did not catch up to North-Korea in per capita income until 1969. Prior to that time, they were a little higher.

We now felt we could be confident of our national power when we conducted negotiations or talked with them. But we had a problem from the point of view of the people's anti-communist education. Up to that time, we had dealt with communism through strong anti-communist education, so we were concerned with what kinds of problems might arise if we talked with the North Koreans. This was because of the great effect it would have on the people's anti-communist consciousness. However, we decided that because the people's concern was in the direction of economic growth and they now had confidence we would probably get some degree of support rather than a strong negative reaction.

The 15 August 1970 statement came from such a background. The 15 August statement was quite lengthy, but it's spirit can be summarized as saying, "Let North and South have a competition of good will."

Research into ways of realizing the 15 August statement continued for another year.

It was 1 year later on 12 August 1971, that Ch'oe Tu-son, president of the Red Cross, proposed North and South Red Cross talks to reunite separated families. That was the "12 August proposal."

Cho Tok-song: As a matter of fact, you could say that there has been a lot of fluctuation in our national efforts and political efforts for reunification. It is no exaggeration to say that prior to the 15 August statement discussion of reunification was absolutely proscribed among the general citizenry.

You could say that the form the people's consciousness took was that the very fact of mentioning reunification was a dangerous thing and it was a prohibited area which could bring bodily danger.

Right before the 15 August statement, the government sought the advice of journalists on the statement.

The general reaction of the journalists was, first, surprise that it was an official statement of our government recognizing the Pyongyang ruling group whose legality and propriety could not be recognized, and second, they pointed out that it was a violation of the law of the time.

However, the government organs explained that as an issue belonging to the sphere of the higher exercise of power, it was not subject to the discussion of conflict with the law of the time. At any rate the 15 August statement was released the next day. I recall that with the release of the 15 August statement certain academic and journalist circles began to feel that an atmosphere had been created for the discussion of reunification, albeit very carefully and in a very low voice.

Chong Hong-chin: To explain why our side proposed the Red Cross talks, historically the North-South confrontation continued after the Korean War. Looking at the proposals regarding the reunification issue which they had put forward as propaganda, they proposed to handle the whole problem at once. That is, they put forth no rules or guidelines for the resolution of the problem. In such a situation of confrontation, we felt that we should hold talks in which some worldwide principles or guidelines could be standards. For example, in boxing the rules say that you fight in a four-cornered ring and do not hit below the belt. We thought that you could not hope for any results from North-South talks without any rules. In terms of world history, the charitable work of the Red Cross had established precedents. That is, historically there have been many cases of separation due to war, and the Red Cross has established standards for solving such problems. Thus the North-South Red Cross Talks were proposed in the belief that they would proceed more smoothly. At any rate, we felt that we must close the chapter of sharp North-South confrontation, that we had to create a channel

of communication, that if we continued on it might result in national tragedy, and that the Red Cross talks represented the means with established international rules which presented the least likelihood of misunderstanding in the communication process. Also, we thought we could exclude political overtones from the reuniting of separated families, a humanitarian effort difficult for anyone to oppose.

Cho Tok-song: On 12 August 1971, 1 year after the 15 August statement, the then president of the Korean Red Cross, Ch'oe Tu-son, said that he had an important announcement and requested a news conference. There was much speculation about what the important announcement could be; upon hearing President Ch'oe's announcement we found that it was the movement to reunite separated families. President Ch'oe's proposal was that since there was also a Red Cross organ in North Korea the Red Cross societies should resolve the problem through joint talks. If the previous year's 15 August statement was the first reunification shock, then the 12 August statement was the second. On 14 August, Radio Pyongyang responded positively to the proposal and both sides confirmed it on paper through representatives at P'anmunjom. The Korean Red Cross again proposed preliminary talks and that led directly to the opening of the first preliminary talks on 20 September. At that time Mr Chong participated in the talks as a Red Cross preliminary talk representative. Mr Chong fulfilled a pipeline role of conveying various government orders in the process of the conduct of the talks. It is my understanding that Mr Chong's position was to seek out the possibility of achieving political contact or political talks apart from the Red Cross talks. Please explain concretely the process by which secret contact with the North was achieved.

Chong Hong-chin: At that time I was our number three representative and Mr Kim Yon-chu was our chief representative. The alternative chief representative was the head of the Korean Red Cross South Ch'ungch'ong branch, Mr Pak Son-kyu, and my official duty was head of the operations division of the Korean Red Cross talks office. For the North, Kim T'ae-hui was the head of their delegation, seconded by Kim Tok-hyon. But there is something interesting about all North Korean organizations. The number two men is very strong, and that is because he is dispatched from the party. Is not North Korea a society where the party controls and rules everything? You could say that among the multiple number two men of any organization, there is one from the Korean Workers Party who has the real power.

I directly received our government's instructions. Kim Tok-hyon, who was later a directing member from the Pyongyang side of the North-South Coordinating Committee, was a responsible director of organizations for the KWP Central Committee. Kim T'ae-hui was in charge of conducting the meetings, but Kim Tok-hyon was the one who actually had the authority to speak, even though Kim Tae-hui had been ambassador to Romania and was chief delegate at the main talks.

As it happened, after seats were arranged, I, our third representative, sat directly across from Kim Tok-hyon, their number two delegate. Usually the talking is done by the head delegate. But the talks were making almost no progress on the issue of the topics of the main talks. That is, to us the topic was the reuniting of separated families, but they insisted on including

relatives and friends. Friends cannot be included in separated families. One person may consider the other to be a friend, but the other may not agree. In a word, the concept is too broad and ambiguous. We said that it could not be a topic for the Red Cross talks and, as result, there was little progress in the talks. As I remember, it was in late November, exactly 2 months after the preliminary talks began. Thinking that we had to break the stalemate, that we had to discover their real intention. I wrote a memo on a piece of paper, rolled it up and passed it to Kim Tok-hyon, who was sitting across from me.

It said let's meet and talk freely; instead of fighting in the open meetings, let's meet privately. Of course, this proposal was at the direction of the government.

At that time, the meetings were being held weekly; they said we could meet 1 week later at the next meeting. Our first talk took place in the preliminary meeting hall after all the other delegates had departed. Wishing to verify that I was the appropriate person to talk with, Kim Tok-hyon demanded a document verifying my status. Such a document is ultimately an identification paper; KCIA Director Yi Hu-rak wrote a letter entrusting me with the mission. Earlier I said that it was my belief that we needed a dialogue between North and South. Since neither Kim nor I were originally Red Cross people, when secret contact was established we revealed our true colors (laughter) and began to discuss political problems rather than the topic of the preliminary talks. In the process, our KCIA director proposed a meeting with Kim Yong-chu, director of the KWP's Organization and Guidance Department. That was because not only was Kim Yong-chu Kim Il-song's younger brother, but also because we judged him to be the true number two power in North Korea as the head of the KWP Organization and Guidance Department. A KWP director is roughly analogous to a prime minister and the director of the Organization and Guidance Department is the strongest of all. Believing that we needed to talk with the powers that be, we initiated secret contacts hoping to, on the one hand, overcome the difficulties of the Red Cross preliminary talks while on the other hand proposing high level talks to negotiate political issues between North and South; the North agreed. Thus I began talking with Kim Tok-hyon regarding the procedures for such a meeting.

Cho Tok-song: In that wav. Mr Chong neogitated the realization, finally, of a meeting between KCIA Director Yi Hu-rak and Kim Yong-chu; however, it is my understanding that Mr Chong went alone to Pyongyang prior to any high level North-South meetings. That is well known. In fact, since the establishment of the government following liberation, Mr Chong's trip to Pyongyang was the first trip made with official blessings for the purpose of North-South talks or government contacts.

Mr Chong, how is it that you went first, what was your purpose, and how did you feel? The events of your 3-night, 4-day trip to Pyongyang are not mere objects of curiosity as a secret trip, but rather are of deep significance as the first concrete step toward the 4 July joint statement. Please tell us in detail of the events of that time.

Chong Hong-chin: My Pyongyang trip of 3 nights and 4 days took place from 28-31 March 1972. However, the meeting place had not been determined at the time when the KCIA director proposed talks with the director of the organizational department. We simply suggested a third country. Thinking that high level talks could not be realized solely through contacts between Kim Tok-hyon and me, that I would have to meet directly with the persons concerned in Pyongyang to confirm things, that is to say, thinking that I would have to prepare the way, I made the trip to Pyongyang.

My purpose was, of course, to arrange a meeting between Director Yi Hu-rak and Director Kim Yong-chu. Also, I had to speak directly with Kim Yong-chu, as well as to verify their public motive and their true intent during my comings and goings. I have nothing in particular to say about my feelings at the time. Since I was following my superior's orders, I was only concerned with carrying them out faithfully. Also, as any of our people can understand, I wanted to resolve issues through dialogue one by one in order to prevent the tragedy of another war. That such a noble mission was entrusted to me could be seen as fortune. I felt that I was doing something worthwhile, that I had to do my sincerest to carry out my duties. People often ask the naive question, "Weren't you afraid?" I did not worry at all about my safety. That was because although the first secret contacts were carried out in the neutral country observer committee, later contacts were carried out alternately in the P'anmun-gak and the Freedom House. Since the P'anmun-gak is in their territory, there was not much difference between it and Pyongyang. The problem had already been put to the test. Also, we had received a letter the KWP Organization and Guidance Department director sent to the KCIA director guaranteeing my personal safety.

I went over to the P'anmun-gak about 10 o'clock in the morning, 28 March 1972. P'anmun-gak is, in a manner of speaking, their reception hall, and Kim Tok-hyon met me there. There were no paperwork procedures since it was a secret entry. I took one suitcase holding my clothing and personal effects. I took no tape recorder, carrying only a notebook. After riding about 30 minutes in a sedan they provided, I arrived at an air force heliport just shy of Kaesong where my guide Kim Tok-hyon and I transferred to a large Soviet-made helicopter which even had tables at the passenger seats. We arrived at a heliport south of Pyongyang in about 50 minutes. The weather was clear and I would clearly see the fields to the north.

I was taken to the Moran-bong reception site to rest from my trip. That afternoon I was taken to the Hungbu reception site. It was a reception site at the foot of the hills around the Taedong River; I thought it to be a reception site operated by the KWP Organization and Guidance Department.

Kim Yong-chu looked like Kim Il-song but he was not as large as his older brother and did not give me any particular impression. Kim Cung-nin looked very sharp. When I told Kim Yong-chu that Director Yi Hu-rak would like to meet him, Kim replied, "I, too, would like to meet him."

He said, "Let's get together and talk." Kim Yong-chu said, "It's difficult to maintain secrecy in a third country, so it would be better to meet in Pyongyang or Wonsan." He gave the impression that talks would have to be held in Pyongyang in order to meet with the highest official, i.e., Kim Il-song.

Cho Tok-song; How was Kim Yong-chu's health at the time?

Chong Hong-chin: Just to look at, he seemed very healthy. I could only follow where they led me. Most of the places I went were places like Kim Il-song's birth home, Mangyong-dae, and agricultural and industrial exhibits. Theatres in the evening. As when Director Yi Hu-rak went, my lodging was at the cabinet's Moran-bong reception site. A reception site is a place to host visitors, and as they have no privately operated hotels, each organ has its own reception site, e.g., the cabinet reception site looks right down on Nungna Island and is said to have once been a temple site.

The Moran-bong reception site has three buildings; I stayed in one room of a single storey building near the Ch'ongnyu Wall. They said that the room across from mine was one where the highest dignitaries such as Sucharto and Sihanouk stayed. Later, Director Yi Hu-rak stayed in that room. Meals were taken in the reception site dining room. I remember rainbow trout sashimi and pollack roe as being particularly tasty. The number of side dishes was limited and things tasted simple because they did not use sugar or monosodium glutamate. They eat in the Chinese manner in that they bring out a large side dish plate and put small servings in each person's dish.

Following Kim Tok-hyon around, I was unable to get a close look at the citizens of Pyongyang, but all the men wore people's clothing while the women all wore white blouses and black skirts. The impression was that North Korea is like black and white television while South Korea is like color television. The colors of the people and the streets were monotonous to the point of being cold and pitiful. Some more colorful clothing was on display in the industrial exhibits, but it did not seem as though such clothing was yet distributed. Since there were no regular visitors to the exhibits when I was there, they were probably restricting access at those times.

I visited Kim Yong-chu to pay my respects when I returned on 31 March. It snowed heavily that day and the helicopter departed late. I was scheduled to arrive at P'anmunjom in the morning but did not arrive and cross the 38th parallel until the afternoon.

Our side was quite worried. Of course, they had no way to contact me while in Pyongyang, although North Korea could contact our side. As soon as I arrived in Seoul, I went with Director Yi Hu-rak straight to the Blue House to report to President Park Chung-hee. President Park offered many drinks of liquor while saying, "You've done a service." I went straight home, where my wife complained, "You went on a business trip to Cheju Island and did not even bring home any mandarine oranges." I had told her I was going to Cheju Island when I left for Pyongyang (laughter).

The North had first said it would send two people to Seoul, but eventually Kim Tok-hyon came by himself. He came to Seoul on 19 April 1972, and went through a process very much like what I had experienced in Pyongyang. First he had an interview with KCIA Director Yi Hu-rak, and if he wished to go somewhere, I guided him. He stayed at the Choson Hotel. This may be an aside, but in order to preserve secrecy we avoided the front door and used the

arcade side door and elevator. There really was no need for thorough disguise and we had him behave like an ordinary guest. We did ask that he remove the Kim Il-song badge he always wore.

One day this incident took place. After Director Yi Hu-rak treated Kim Tok-hyon to supper at Segom-jong, Yi drove the car himself to the Sam-il Building. He seated Kim Tok-hyon next to him. He took Kim Tok-hyon to the restaurant at the top of the Sam-il Building so he could view the Seoul night scene as much as he wanted. He showed him the elevated highway built on Ch'onggye-ch'on, whose old slum North Korea had propagandized so badly. It was Director Yi's intention to show him the confidence of our open system.

Kim Tok-hyon had had much experience, in foreign service and seemed to be a very active person with a tendency to push weaker persons around pointlessly. Being obsequious before superiors and arrogant to inferiors is a common characteristics of their KWP cadre. That is because they can protect themselves only by watching their superiors. Because Kim Hyon-dok's and my visits were limited to verifying the other side's intentions, we left behind no documentation.

Cho Tok-song: It was thus that the high level meetings took shape; did you Mr Chong, go with KCIA Director Yi Hu-rak on his trip to Pyongyang?

Chong Hong-chin: Just when Director Yi Hu-rak would go to Pyongyang was the problem. The two sides finally agreed and he made a trip to Pyongyang from 2 May to 5 May 1972. At that time, too, we of course got a letter guaranteeing Yi's personal safety. At that time, a direct telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang was established; it was set up provisionally to make it possible for Director Yi to contact Seoul from Pyongyang. It became official later on when the coordinating committee was formed.

(Editor's note: Prior to Director Yi Hu-rak's trip to Pyongyang President Park gave Yi a "presidential instruction for trips into special areas" on 26 April 1972. The instruction directed Yi to lay out the Republic of Korea's basic position as follows: one, the reunification of the fatherland must ultimately be a peaceful reunification achieved through political talks; two, recognizing the situation of North and South where political, economic, social, and other areas have developed under two different systems for 25 years, reunification must be achieved through the resolution of the full range of problems; three, thus the current Red Cross talks should be encouraged in order to achieve a resolution of that humanitarian issue; four, political issues should be approached while resolving economic and cultural issues; and five, in order to improve the atmosphere between North and South, the proposing of one-sided, unrealistic reunification plans must stop while simultaneously stopping name-calling and criticism between North and South and actions directly or indirectly bothering the other side militarily must be eliminated.

The persons accompanying Director Yi at that time were three: a secretary, a doctor, and me. Just as on my earlier trip, they used a helicopter from a heliport just shy of Kaesong. When we arrived at the heliport south of Pyongyang's Taedong River, Kim Yong-chu was there to greet us. Our lodging

was the same Moran-bong cabinet reception site. Director Yi immediately called his home in Seoul and told his wife of the scenery. Director Yi had his first meeting with Kim Yong-chu that day, and they exchanged general views on North-South problems. The next day (3 May), they held the second meeting but it seems that all the important things were said when meeting Kim Il-song on 4 May. I'm not sure, but I remember the meeting with Kim Il-song lasting for about an hour starting at 12:10 in the morning of 4 May.

After the second meeting with Kim Yong-chu in the afternoon of 3 May, we went in the evening to the Pyongyang theater to see a musical; we then returned to the reception site and had a late meal in the dining hall. The man in charge of guiding Director Yi's party at this time was Yu Chang-sik, who later attended the North-South Coordinating Committee as vice-chairman for the Pyongyang side; he and Kim Tok-hyon both ate with us. At the time, Yu Chang-sik was the KWP Organization and Guidance Department assistant director and the director of the External Affairs Department.

That evening Director Yi changed into his pajamas and went to bed while in the room across from him were the doctor and the head of the security guard; I was to sleep in a room in another building apart from the single-storey building in the middle of the reception site. This building contained an office, and was where Kim Tok-hyon stayed. Late that night Yu Chang-sik came to my room, saying to awaken Director Yi and go somewhere. He did not reveal where, just saying we would know when we got there. In the face of his unconditional urging to go, I had no choice but to awaken Director Yi and get in the car. Yu Chang-sik or Kim Tok-hyon rode in front, and Director Yi and I in the back. The rain was pouring down in an unseasonable shower, and the car left the main road and took a new, single lane paved road. Previously I had gone from the Moran-bong reception site by the main road to the Taedong River bridge, and this was a totally new road to me. As I later found out, we took a shortcut across Moran-bong. For example, we usually go via Changch'ung-dong to get from downtown Seoul to the Tower Hotel, but we can cut across Namsan. It is true that we were tense. We arrived at Kim Il-song's office next to the Mansu-dae assembly hall. When we were about to ride the elevator on the first floor, the other two members of Director Yi's party came trailing in.

I think we rode the elevator up three or four floors. The building seemed to have two or three floors below ground. Kim Il-song was waiting for us in front of the elevator. Whether it was because he had previously received many reports about me, he joked, "Comrade Chone Hong-chin is an old acquaintance." They took pictures at that time, and later presented them to us in a commemorative album. Their protocol seems different from ours. We would first seat our guests and then bring in the president, but Kim Il-song was there first.

I do not remember much about the decoration or furniture of Kim Il-song's office to which we had been taken. I was concentrating on recording the conversation. It does seem that there was a plate with fruit and a knife on a table.

Kim Il-song was a large-bodied man with big gestures and lots to say. He was, shall we say, loquacious. His manner of speech was not middle-class Pyongyang, but rather lower-class and he expressed himself very easily. For example, he used many direct expressions such as saying, "We will hold you" rather than, "If you come here, we may detain and not release you."

Kim Il-song had the mannerism of affirming himself by saying, "Hum, that is right," after speaking at some length. I have heard from psychologists that people with such a manner of speech are stubborn and dictatorial.

After meeting for about an hour that night, Kim Il-song again invited Director Yi's party for lunch the next day, holding a second meeting while dining. On this occasion, Kim Il-song said he was very sorry to have made us come in the middle of the night the night before but that he was in the habit of working late at night and thus he was inviting us for lunch. I still do not know why he called for us in the middle of the night. I suspect he takes naps. And he seems to eat supper around 8 in the evening.

The attendees at that night's meeting were Kim Yong-chu, Pak Song-ch'ol, Kim Chung-nin, and Kim Tok-hyon. Kim Il-song sat by himself with Pak song-ch'ol at his side and the rest sitting along the wall. This meeting, too, was mostly an exchange of general ideas. Kim Il-song said the following.

"Let us wash away our mutual mistrust. I have greater trust and have decided to hold talks because the communist-catcher Director Yi has come."

There was this particularly memorable statement. When Director Yi stated that our position was to wash away the mistrust with gradual talks and resolve issues one-by-one, the question of why the mistrust exists naturally arose. It was because of the war, and talk turned to the Korean War. When Director Yi said we had to ascertain things about the war, Kim Il-song said, "The past is the past; we would not invade the South again."

He clearly used the expression "invade the South." The statement reported in the media that, "the past is the past..." made by Pak Song-ch'ol at the second joint committee chairmen's meeting of the North-South Coordinating Committee in November 1972 recognizing the invasion of the South was an exact repetition of Kim Il-song's words at this time. Kim Yong-chu did explain that the North was responding to provocation from the South, citing the battle of Kachi Peak, Songak Mountain, but Kim Il-song could make such an apologetic statement because he does not have to answer to anyone else. When talking about eliminating mistrust, the 21 January incident also came up. Director Yi said that mistrust had built up because of incidents like that, and that although we all held the same views on dialogue and reunification, we would have to resolve the residue of things like that.

Kim Il-song responded, "Please tell President Park that I am very sorry about the Blue House incident and any other incident. That incident was done by leftist extremists among us. I did not know about it at the time. Thus I removed from office the chief of staff and the chief of the Reconnaissance Bureau of the State Political Security Department."

Cho Tok-song: Kim Il-song apologized for the Korean War and the 21 January incident when Mr Chong went with Director Yi to talk with Kim Il-song, but I, too, heard the same things. I first stayed in Pyongyang for 4 nights and 5 days in August 1972 for the first main Red Cross meeting. At 9:30 on the night of the 4th day, the assistant head of the Secretariat of their Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland, Kim Kil-hyon, and Paek Nam-chun, vice-chairman of the General Federation of Trade Unions separately invited Seoul National University professor Pak Chun-Kyu and me to the Ongnyu-gwan. We did not sit in the hall but rather in the heated-floor room at the back to talk, where they argued as follows:

"Let us have an unofficial North-South meeting here. Why do you keep talking about 'stages'? If we are reunited tomorrow, then the separated families and everybody else can meet, hold each other and sing...."

We replied: "Of course we would like that. The 40 million people of the South all live in hope of reunification. When we said we were going to Pyongyang to hold North-South talks, the people sent us off with cheers of encouragement; even so, in the people's hearts they cannot hide their feelings of insecurity and defensiveness even in the midst of the excited atmosphere of holding talks. Just a few years ago there was the 21 January incident, and such a thing may happen again. In order to show the South that there would not be any such thing, the Red Cross talks must be carried out rationally and orderly to demonstrate such an aspect. As high ranking persons, you must be aware of the 21 January incident."

Curious as to whether advisory committee members of this level would know, we told them. Paek Nam-chun responded to us with a stiffening face.

"That is an affair about which neither the leader nor the party knew anything. It was a mistake made by leftist extremist elements. Believe me, there will be no such thing in the future."

As Mr Chong has already said, and as I myself heard in Pyongyang, they recognized unofficially, in whatever circumstances, that they had started the Korean War and the 21 January incident.

Mr Chong, did the 4 July joint statement begin to sprout from the talks your party had with Kim Il-song in Pyongyang?

Chong Hong-chin: In the two meetings with Kim Il-song, the issues of principle were discussed. You know the principles of reunification. As stated in the 4 July statement, it is to be done independently and peacefully, and there is to be national solidarity. We had such exchanges of views and discussions on the principles. When the talk turned to eliminating mistrust, reunifying peacefully, and preventing another war like the Korean War, there was also an exchange of ideas on the issue of differing ideologies since we are liberalist and they are communist. Although in the statement we called it transcendence, at the time we discussed mutually recognizing and setting aside the differences in ideals and thought, saying that it was useless to discuss those issues.

Kim Il-song spoke of his distrust of us as follows:

"Are you not planning to invade the North in collusion with the United States and Japan?"

What Kim Il-song was saying is that there could be no reunification with foreign help. Nobody suggested the 4 July statement first; we simply arrived at agreement in the process of exchanging ideas. They apparently talk as though we assented to Kim Il-song's three principles of reunification; they were not something proposed by one side and accepted by the other but rather something agreed upon in the straight-forward process of exchanging ideas. Who would oppose the ideals of peace, independence, and solidarity? Director Yi said neither side should make one-sided, propagandistic proposals, that since they only deepend mistrust we should work together with negotiations. They agreed. It was this kind of general exchange of views, and nothing was put on paper. At the end, we generally agreed that a coordinating committee was needed to coordinate the full range of problems between North and South such as political, economic, and military issues.

On that occasion, Director Yi invited Kim Yong-chu to Seoul, whereupon Kim Il-song said, "Kim Yong-chu is suffering from a disorder of the involuntary nervous system and cannot possibly do work such as meetings. Please understand. I will send instead Comrade Pak Song-ch'ol whom I trust as my brother. Kim Yong-chu has already stopped working. Furthermore, he is under doctor's orders." When Director Yi continued to designate Kim Yong-chu to be invited to Seoul, Kim Il-song said, "Kim Yong-chu has been so ill that he has been in convalescence and he only returned for this affair." Even after that, we continued to press for Kim Yong-chu to come to Seoul, but they refused, saying it was impossible. This was what later gave birth to misunderstanding. That is, we left unresolved a point of contention. Finally, we were forced to agree.

Thus Pak Song-ch'ol, Yu Chang-sik, Kim Tok-hyon, a secretary and a physician came to Seoul where they stayed from 29 May to 1 June. It was the reception hall of what is now the Silla Hotel but was then a reception hall under the management of the Prime Minister's Office.

We distinguished them as members of the General Confederation of Koreans in Japan. They had two meetings with Director Yi. The talks at the time were again exchanges of general views. We explained our position on reunification policy, and they explained theirs. We urged the gradual and concrete building up of single achievements, while they were trying to achieve everything at once through some kind of political negotiations. This difference in viewpoints persisted thereafter; I think it was at this time that the difference in the fundamental method of resolution became clear. That is while there was no difference between North and South in basic, general principles, there was a difference in concrete methods of implementation. They kept leading the talks in the direction of a summit meeting, while we argued that we actually had to see the dissolution of distrust, that we should continue the already underway Red Cross talks to begin solving easy problems and improving the atmosphere, and that we could have a summit conference only after trust was restored. Let me quote what President Park told Pak Song-ch'ol when the latter called at the Blue House.

"You are suggesting that we demolish the wall between North and South with one blow, but in order to restore trust it must be done one brick at a time.

"You, Vice-minister Pak Song-ch'ol, have taken tests. On a test, you do not answer the easy problems first and leave the hard ones for later? We must handle the North-South talks in the same way."

Cho Tok-song: How did Pak Song-ch'ol address President Park?

Chong Hong-chin: Pak Song-ch'ol's attitude toward President Park was very respectful. He called him, "Your honor President Park." President Park met Pak's party in the Blue House reception room. Those present from our side included Director Yi, KCIA Assistant Director Kim ch'i-yol, who had guided Pak Song-ch'ol, and me. Pak Song-ch'ol said, "I will deliver the General Secretary comrade's message," and read down a piece of paper. It contained greetings from Kim Il-song to President Park and discussion on the principles of unification. President Park hosted cocktails in the dining hall before the banquet. When President Park urged a drink on Pak, saying, "Let's have a drink," Pak tried anxiously to avoid drinking, saying "I'm taking medicine now...." He looked very tense and probably was not drinking for fear of making a mistake.

Cho Tok-song: Kim Yong-chu was the person who signed the 4 July joint statement, when in fact the person who carried things out was Pak Song-ch'ol. Is that not right?

Chong Hong-chin: The talks revealed that the true power there was Pyongyang's vice chairman for the Coordinating Committee, Yu Chang-sik. The official agent was Pak Song-ch'ol, but it appeared that major decisions were handled by Yu Chang-sik. Pak Song-ch'ol was older than Yu and belonged to Kim Il-song's inside group and thus could not work under Kim Yong-chu, but Yu Chang-sik actually acted for Kim Yong-chu as a director of the Organization and Guidance Department. Pak Song-ch'ol was skilled at diplomatic expression, while Yu Chang-sik was direct and businesslike.

I believe that Kim Yong-chu's illness was not a sham and that he was, as Kim Il-song said, seriously ill. Of course, we cannot exclude the possibility that they were deliberately pushing Kim Yong-chu back to the second line in 1972, since in 1973 they began to push forward Kim Chong-il.

Cho Tok-song: Did the work of drafting the 4 July joint statement begin to ferment at the time of Pak Song-ch'ol's visit to Seoul?

Chong Hong-chin: The thing that was decided through the exchange of views between North and South was to make a coordinating committee to coordinate the various problems between North and South. North and South had reached an agreement. Thus, we had to inform the people; but since we had agreed to go back and forth to each other's side, it was now Director Yi's turn to go to Pyongyang. In mid-June Kim Tok-hyon and I began to meet at P'anmunjom in order to work on the drafts. Because of the differences in views and terminology between the two sides, at first it was a matter of deciding what should go in rather than dealing with a complete document.

We presented the first draft. They then presented a revised draft and we presented another revision. As a result, it was a mixture of their terminology and ours. I remember it being 28 June that we reached agreement through this process of mutual presentation and revision; we signed it provisionally. Kim Tok-hyon and I signed it provisionally and we agreed to release it at 10 am 4 July. We sent our copy to Pyongyang for Kim Yong-chu's signature and they sent theirs to Seoul for Director Yi's signature. Thus it was released in Seoul and Pyongyang at the same time on 4 July.

Looking at the 4 July joint statement, you can surmise to some degree, the relations between North and South at the time. That is, the modifying phrase, "Each upholding the wishes of his superior" appeared in front of the names of the signatories. The North and South had been confronting each other in a fierce standoff and mistrust. We had been pursuing a reunification policy that did not recognize the existence of the North. Because the making of the 4 July joint statement into an official document would mark a radical departure in existing reunification policies, it was understood by both sides that specifying "Each upholding the wishes of his superior" meant that it was done by delegation from the president.

Perhaps, if the Red Cross talks, whose contacts were already underway, had progressed further and the movement to reunite separated families had taken shape to some degree, we would have done things differently, but they were still in the preliminary talks so we decided to agree on principles and mutually to view the document as official; if we had used the form of a treaty between the two governments, we would have given the world and our people the impression of a radical departure in reunification policy. The shock that the 4 July joint statement itself created is explanation enough.

Cho Tok-song: After the 4 July joint statement was released, certain circles made many criticisms regarding the use of terminology. You must have had much difficulty preparing the drafts.

Chong Hong-chin: Although the 4 July joint statement was a mixing of their terminology and our terminology, there was not a great deal of difficulty because the terms all had the same meanings.

There was also no great difficulty with the content because it had already been discussed in our meeting with Kim Il-song in Pyongyang and in the meeting in Seoul. For example, at the very beginning, it says, "Both sides have agreed on the following principles for the reunification of the fatherland," and then it lists the three items of agreement: independence, peace and solidarity.

Those were all things we had agreed on with Kim Il-song.

Next is the section which says, "Each side agrees not to engage in criticism harmful to the other and will not engage in small or large armed provocations." In fact, "large" meant armed provocations on the armistice line and "small" meant armed secret agents. If we had said, "Let's not send spies." then it would have caused an uproar, so we had no choice but to express it in that way.

Cho Tok-song: Thus the 4 July joint statement was released. Gaining impetus from the 4 July joint statement, the preliminary Red Cross talks immediately began to progress at a very rapid tempo. With the 25th preliminary meeting on 11 August 1972, the preliminary talk phase came to a close, and the first Red Cross main meeting opened in Pyongyang on 30 August as agreed by both sides. Subsequently, with the holding of the second main meeting in Seoul on 13 September, the North and South Delegations officially began their alternating trips to Seoul and Pyongyang.

I went to the North at that time. Just before we left there was somewhat of a controversy. We had released the names of seven persons on our advisory committee and Pyongyang had rejected one, Kim Hui-chong, as not suitable. After some controversy, we replaced him with another person. How did that come about?

Chong Hong-chin: After we released the names of our advisory committee, they took issue with it. The reason was that Kim Hui-chong, president of SISA PRESS, was listed as head of the association of people from the five provinces of North Korea. If his title had been listed only as president of SISA PRESS, then North Korea could not have taken issue, but since he was listed as head of the association of people from the five provinces of North Korea, it became a problem. To put it in the perspective of Kim Tok-hyon, their position would have been odd if they had let in the head of the association of people from the five provinces of North Korea. He also argued that they could just as well carry out the talks for reuniting separated families with the association of people from the five provinces of North Korea without even talking with us. They apparently even got ahold of the compact of the association. According to the compact, the association was to control the people from the five provinces and to recover those provinces. Thus they protested, saying that it was difficult and that they could not possibly assent. We responded that an advisory committee member is one who advises the delegation and that his social position was not something to make into an issue. At any rate, there was much discussion.

Our position was one of actively pushing the Red Cross talks, whereas their position was that they would rather hold political talks than have the Red Cross talks. Thinking that in order to realize the Pyongyang meeting we would have to yield, that as the elder brother we should show some leniency, we assented to their proposal, but it was not proper for them to raise a ruckus over the composition of our delegation.

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CSO: 4107/195

INTER-KOREAN AFFAIRS

NORTH KOREA'S KIDNAPING OF TWO ARTISTS UNVEILED

Seoul KYONGHYANG SINMUN in Korean 2 Apr 84 p 3

[Article: "Conspiracy Over a Long Period of Time"]

[Text] The North Korean puppets are attempting a plot against South Korea, even by utilizing Ch'oe Un-hui and Sin Sang-ok whom they have kidnaped and confined, the fact of which has been concealed in a veil for a long time, to recover their tarnished image in the international community owing to the recent Burma and Tataepo incidents.

As a part of their plots, the puppets planned to force Ch'oe Un-hui and Sin Sang-ok to have a press conference in the Eastern European communist countries or North Korea around 15 April; Kim Il-song's 72nd birthday, and to advertise both domestically and internationally by announcing disguisedly that Ch'oe Un-hui and Sin Sang-ok were not forcibly kidnaped, but defected to North Korea voluntarily after having longed for the North Korean social system, and that now they are enjoying their artistic activities freely. And by taking advantage of the chance, the puppets plan to attack South Korea in order to weaken its status by slandering and fabricating criticisms of the South Korean political-social system and of leading figures.

The North Korean puppets are also contemplating attempts to drag Ch'oe Un-hui and Sin Sang-ok to Eastern European bloc countries such as the Soviet Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, etc and to force them to film and produce a movie titled "A Generation of Eternity" which intends to beautify the leadership of Kim Il-song and his son and to slander and intrigue against the leaders and the high official figures of South Korea, and then the film is going to be presented to Kim Il-song on 15 April, his birthday, as "a gift of loyalty" to celebrate the birthday. The puppets are also plotting to play fabricated dramas of propaganda on the methods of running the film in the Pyongyang International Art Exhibition which will be held around the time of Kim Il-song's birthday, while creating a frenzied festival mood, especially for those from about 10 of the pro-North Korea foreign artists organizations, including 50 people of the "Japan-Korea Exchange Music Concert," whom they plan to invite, and of submitting it to the East Germany Film Festival of April and International Film Festivals such as the Canne Film Festival in May, or of presenting it for the purpose of propaganda distribution to foreign countries.

Furthermore, it was clearly proven that the puppets tried to mobilize every possible sly means in that they intended to decoy and kidnap the elder brother of Sin Sang-ok, Sin T'ae-joon and the nephew, Sin Myong-gil in Korea to North Korea and to utilize them as resident spies after pulling them onto their side, and especially in that they intrigued to bring out two children of Sin Sang-ok born from his common-law wife, O Su-mi, to the United States safely under the pretext of adoption.

The background of the North Korean puppets' kidnaping of Ch'oe Un-hui and Sin Sang-ok is that in August 1977 the operation agent of North Korean puppets in Hong Kong, I Sang-hui (58), receiving the direction to "kidnap Ch'oe Un-hui and Sin Sang-ok to North Korea," ordered the culprit Kim Kyu-wha, the branch chief of Hong Kong Sin Film Co. (62, sentenced 15 years for the crime of espionage) to obtain the invitation document necessary to decoy Ch'oe Un-hui to Hong Kong, while I Sang-hui bribed a Chinese movie broker, Wang Dong-il, residing in Hong Kong, through Kim Kyu-wha with the bribe of Hong Kong \$7,000 as a culprit, and controlled Wang to enter into Korea and meet to entice her to Hong Kong under the disguised pretext of asking her to attend the Hong Kong carnival which was to be held in December 1977.

Following the order, Wang Dong-il infiltrated into South Korea on 29 September 1977 and met Ch'oe Un-hui, Kim Hui-kap, T'ae Hyon-sil, etc at T'ae Won Hotel, located in Seoul Chung Ku Ch'ungmu-Ro 2ga, and after getting their acceptances to the invitation, he came back to Hong Kong on 13 October 1977 and reported it to I Sang-hui.

Enticing With the Role of Main Star

In October 1977, Kim Kyu-wha following the order of I Sang-hui, attained a letter of invitation signed in the name of the company of Kum Hyon Film Business from Si Jo-um, a movie producer and the representative of the company, and provided it for I Sang-hui. In November, 1977, Wang Dong-il, controlled by I Sang-hui, enticed Ch'oe Un-hui by saying that "the invitation to the Hong Kong carnival was called off due to the local situation, but I want to discuss the Hong Kong movie "Yangguibi" with you for which we would like you to be the main star of the film, and when Ch'oe Un-hui accepted, I Sang-hui mailed a letter of invitation and an air ticket for only Ch'oe Un-hui around the end of November 1977."

Ch'oe Un-hui, who was caught in the trap, left for Hong Kong on 11 January and, guided by Kim Kyu-wha and Wang Dong-il, stayed at room 612 of the Hong Kong Prama Hotel. On 13 January, after Ch'oe Un-hui did some shopping for homecoming gifts at the water terminal, she had dinner with Kim Kyu-wha, I Sang-hui and her daughter at Kuk Bin Restaurant in Ku Ryong in which Ch'oe Un-hui made an international call to Kang Chong-hui, the principal of Anyang Arts School through Kim Kyu-wha to inform that "I will arrive in Seoul on 20 January," and she asked Kim Kyu-wha for the ticket reservation, then came back to her hotel. But the next day, 14 January around 5 pm, she was forcibly kidnaped to North Korea by an operation line of North Korean puppets.

When the kidnaping of Ch'oe Un-hui succeeded, Kim Kyu-wha, controlled by the culprit, I Sang-hui, made an international call to Sin Sang-ok and decoyed him to Hong Kong telling him that "Ch'oe Un-hui has disappeared." Arrived Sin Sang-ok, after hearing before and after the situation in which Ch'oe Un-hui was kidnaped coercively by I Sang-hui, whom he had always suspected. To verify the fact, he left Hong Kong the next day, 28 January, and tried to locate Ch'oe Un-hui, going around the countries such as America, Japan, Southeast Asia, France, etc through friends in international film business, with no success. As he could find no clue, he returned to Hong Kong on 14 July of the same year and investigated the whereabouts of Ch'oe Un-hui, but on 19 July, he was forcibly kidnaped to North Korea by an operation line by an operation agent of North Korean puppets who secured Sin Sang-ok's staying in Hong Kong.

The North Korean puppets, by exploiting the family relationship, intended to decoy and kidnap the family of Ch'oe Un-hui and Sin Sang-ok in Korea to outside of South Korea, or to make them resident spies after making up their weakness inside Korea, in order to gather the materials to produce films for slandering and intriguing against South Korea by taking advantage of the family in Korea. They also tried to keep the children born of Sin Sang-ok and O Su-mi as hostages by enticing and kidnaping them through a third country under the pretext of "adoption to America" in order to prevent escape attempts by Ch'oe Un-hui and Sin Sang-ok. Thus, for the purpose, on 25 December last year, they sent a Japanese, Nishida Desuo (36, movie director) to Seoul as a contacting agent and delivered to Sin Sang-ok's family a couple of tapes recording Ch'oe Un-hui and Sin Sang-ok's real voices, two memo sheets written by Sin Sang-ok along with an individual picture of Ch'oe Un-hui and of Sin Sang-ok as the operational ploys in Un Dang Lodge located in Seoul Chongnoku Unnidong on 27 December.

The individual picture of Ch'oe Un-hui was taken against the background of the twin tombs of King Kongmin and Princess Nokuk, Hyon Neung and Chong Neung in Kyongkido Kep'yongkun Chungsumyon Yo neungri which is in the area of North Korea, and Sin Sang-ok's also was confirmed as taken in front of Ch'unma mountain in Kyongkido Kepungkun Yongbuk myon, which is also in North Korea, from both of which it was clearly proven that the North Korean puppets kidnaped the two persons by force and had them live together, and brainwashed them by making them travel the tourist areas of North Korea.

Nevertheless, they were not only using a silly method such as using the Yugoslavian-made cassette tapes for light music and the memo pad of the cocktail bar of the Hilton Hotel in Budapest, Hungary to make it appear as if they were living in an Eastern European country, but also editing the voice of Ch'oe Un-hui three times, and that of Sin Sang-ok 25 times in the process of the recording to conceal the fact of the kidnaping.

Crying Out Ch'oe Un-hui

Ch'oe Un-hui was tearful throughout the whole recording, and deplored it, calling to her elder sister, Ch'oe Kyong Hon (66), that "I wanted to take care of her like my deceased mother." And Sin Sang-ok, also implicitly showing his agonized feeling of being taken advantage of after being kidnaped and confined

by the North Korean puppets by force, said "Do not let anybody else at all listen to what we recorded here," which expressed his anxious feeling of concern about any harmful effect on his family because of them.

Sin Sang-ok continued, "Let us meet in Japan or Hong Kong," "Let my children be adopted in the U.S.A.," and requested his family in Korea to send him 10 movie scenarios including "Ch'unhyang Chon"; "Gorias"; "Setting down in the Lake Leman"; "The Ch'oson Government-General"; "Story of Mr WaRyong's Coming to Seoul"; the latter part of "The Scenery of All Korea"; "Stars Without Names"; "Hong Gil-dong"; "A Scenario Cinematizing the Sin Gum-dan Incident"; "Yee Sun-sin and the Seven-year War," which clearly reveals the intrigue of the North Korean puppets to entice, kidnap and make the family resident spies and to hold the children as hostages, and to gather the materials for producing a movie to conspire against South Korea.

On last 17 February, the North Korean puppets sent Nishida to Korea again to deliver to Sin Sang-ok's family the letters from Sin Sang-ok to his nephew, Sin Myong-kil and the wife, O Su-mi, and a letter from Kim Kyong-sik (60), the operation point in Japan to Sin Sang-ok's family. Those letters said,

"I will send a letter of invitation, thus come to Hong Kong."

"There will arrive someone soon from the U.S.A. for children's adoption problem."

"Send the movie scenarios I asked for soon."

On the one hand, this reveals that the North Korean puppets were pressing for the cooperation of the family to achieve their vicious intriguing intention by taking advantage of the family-relatedness.

On the other hand, they sent the messages with the address of the contacting place in Japan and its phone number, 0484-44-6958, through the operation point, Kim Kyong-sik, openly saying, that: "I sent Mr Nishida to Seoul."

"Even if the invitation is delivered through a letter in the name of Nishida, I want you to call or send me a telegram when you leave, as it was sent by me."

They exposed their vicious facade to reunite the family by contacting the base in Japan directly, without sending letters through Sin Sang-ok.

On 21 February, the next day after Nishida left Korea, they contrived to get Sin Sang-ok to have Kim In-cha the wife of his schoolmate, Kim In-whan, an American immigrant (58, a doctor residing in New Jersey) to go to Korea and promote the adoption of the children for the purpose of enticing and kidnapping them. In the process, Kim In-cha hurried the procedures of the adoption, urging the family that "all the procedures of the adoption must be completed before 15 April this year," or "When this problem is settled, I am supposed to send a telegram to Moscow to set up a date and place to meet with Sin Sang-ok."

This clearly proves that the North Korean puppets are plotting to start slandering attacks and intrigues against South Korea as of 15 April, the birthday of Kim Il-song, and to take the children of Sin Sang-ok as hostages by decoying and kidnaping them before that time.

The real intent of the North Korean puppets was to plot, slander and accuse South Korea even by mobilizing Ch'oe Un-hui and Sin Sang-ok, whom they forcibly kidnapped. They wanted to overcome their extreme internal and external distress caused by their degraded image as a violent terrorist group that the whole world detests. [The North Korean Puppets gained this image] because of their recent series of violent activities such as the Burma incident, the case of the Taeku American Cultural Center, and the Tataepo spying incident, all of which caused increased denial of diplomatic relations from the countries with which they have had relations. All of these activities, as well as the repeated failures of their underground spying activities, brought about the breakdown of their international foundation.

To Beautify the System of Hereditary Succession

Also, they highlighted the leadership of the system of the hereditary succession of Kim Il-song and his son by expelling Kim Choong-nim, the secretary of South Korean operation and appointing Ho Rim the foreign minister instead. As another fabricated drama devised out of desperation to break through their present plight in order to recover their lost international status, they used Ch'oe Un-hui and Sin Sang-ok whom they had concealed in a veil for a long time, by making them have a press conference, and disguisedly announced internally and externally that they were not kidnaped by force but had defected to North Korea voluntarily and were enjoying free artistic activities, with all of which they are aiming at weakening the international status of South Korea by distortedly advertising a climate of free artistic activities in North Korea, and at slandering and fabricating the irony of the South Korean political-social system and injustice as well as the leading figures.

Further, the North Korean puppets are plotting to present the film "A Generation of Eternity," which Ch'oe Un-hui and Sin Sang-ok were forced to produce, to Kim Il-song on this coming 15 April for his birthday as "a gift of loyalty" in order to beautify and solidify the leadership of Kim Il-song and Kim Chong-il and to accuse and intrigue against the South Korean leaders and high officials. Then the film is to be played in a frenzied festival mood created by inviting about 10 pro-North Korea foreign artistic organizations including 50 of the "Japan-Korea Exchange Music Concert" in the International Art Exhibition which is to be held in April, and the film is going to be presented to the International Film Festival (April in East Germany, May to the Canne Film Festival), in order to recover their lost status in the international community since the Burma incident and the Tataepo infiltrating spy case by fabricating, beautifying and showing off the superiority of film arts of North Korea to the world. They also are plotting to decoy and kidnap the family member in Korea by infiltrating a Japanese and an American immigrant as the operational points through operational base, or to drag them into their spying organization

by making up weaknesses so that they can utilize the members of the family as resident spies in order to collect the materials (film, scenarios, or other instruments) for producing films to slander and intrigue against South Korea.

The Whole Picture of Kidnapping
Ch'oe Un-hui and Sin Sang-ok

Kim Chong-il

(The North Korean Commander of
South Korean Operation)

(August 1977)

Kang Hae-ryong

(Chief in charge of Operation
of Nodong Party)

(August 1977)

I Sang-hui

(North Korean operation point
in Hong Kong)

(September 1977)

Kim Kyu-wha

Wang Tong-il

Branch Chief of
Sin Film in Hong Kong
(January 1978)

Hong Kong movie broker,
in charge of the air
ticket and invitation
(November 1977)

Sin Sang-ok

Ch'oe Un-hui

19 July 1978
Kidnaped by the North
Korean operation point

11 January 1978
Arrived in Hong Kong

North Korean

14 January 1978
Kidnaped by the North
Korean operation point
from room 1612 of
Hong Kong Prama Hotel

Operation Line
[outline of ship]

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S.KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

ROUNDTABLE TALKS AMONG POLITICIANS RELIEVED OF POLITICAL BAN

Seoul SIN TONGA in Korean, Vol 4, 1984 pp 98-110

[Article: "Roundtable Talks Among Politicians Relieved of Political Ban: Upon Return to the Field of Politics Again"]

[Text] The Roundtable Talks were held at the conference room of the SIN TONGA daily newspaper on 10 March 1984. The participants are: Pak Il, the former chairman, the Committee for Deliberation of Policies, New Democratic Party; Sin Hyong-sik, the former secretary general of the Democratic Republican Party; Cho Se-hyong, ex-member of the New Democratic Party; Choe Chae-ku, ex-member of the Democratic Republican Party, the chairman, the Committee of Economic and Scientific Affairs of the National Assembly; Pak Ki-chong, the moderator, assistant director of the Department of Politics, TONGA DAILY NEWS.

First-hand Experience of Rapidly Changing Period

Moderator: The second ban lift was made last 25 February. This second ban lift has finally taken place after half a year of ceaseless conjectures about when it would occur. Those 202 "old politicians" who have been in political hibernation for 3 years against their will, owing to the special measure for reform of the political climate which was promulgated on 5 November 1980, were able to return to their political activities. Many people say that this year is the year of politics, but it seems that this year will be a particularly impressive year of politics for those relieved of the political ban.

Many people are observing very closely the movements of those "politicians relieved of the political ban." Although this could be interpreted as simply the celebrating of the return to the field of politics of those people who have been alienated, it seems more likely to be due to the expectation that, in the situation in which the functioning of the present politics is suspected, the familiar politicians might be able to set a good example as they return to politics. Although this does not mean that past politics were exactly great, those whose political activities were banned by the measure, which was far from the principles of democracy even though some described it as "a political change," must have, I guess, many thoughts and many things to say about future activities. Today's roundtable talk is intended to talk about

exactly such things and to evaluate the merits and demerits of past politics and to search for the desirable image of politicians and politics together. Frank talk is expected from four people relieved of the ban who have direct experiences of the period of drastic change.

First, let us start to talk about the past 3 years. Three years can never be called a short time, especially for you four persons, I think, who had been very active in political activities. How have you spent the time?

Sin: In my case, I was in a particular situation before the ban, which was rather different from that of others. I was investigated for a "case of immoral activity," during which I came to think about many things. Looking at the confusion after the death of President Pak, from which many abnormal situations developed, I, first of all, came to reflect upon myself. Would I not also be responsible to a great extent as a politician for bringing about such consequences...I examined myself severely before feeling that my situation was unfair or blaming others.

When I was released from the investigation, my father gave me several pieces of advice. I want you to forgive me for mentioning personal matters, but he told me that I must take this opportunity to change misfortune to blessing without bearing a grudge against anybody, or ascribing the responsibility to others. I kept the advice deeply in my mind. As I followed the advice, the past 3 years provided me a good opportunity for looking into my own life and composing myself after all. In some sense, I feel free and relieved....

Also, my health has improved very much. I was too busy to take care of my health before, but I have done mountain climbing while going without food for a distance of 15-20 kilometers every day for about 60 days, which helped me lose about 10 kilograms, and I feel that even all my viscera and the entrails were cleaned up.

One thing that bothered me was my feeling of guilt and not being able to meet the people around me often because of the political ban, but I think they were understanding. Also, there were many people who helped me both materially and mentally, which I really appreciate. I think I could never forget them.

Period of Practice in Self-examination

Pak: Although there may be various perspectives in looking at the political situation, observing the development of the situation since 26 October right until 17 May, I thought that the people wanted political power to be transmitted to the New Democratic Party. It was a naive thought. But we lost an opportunity to attain power owing to an unexpected incident. In other words, our New Democratic Party, which should have been a leading force to achieve peaceful transmission of power was pushed out from the position. I could not help feeling greatly responsible for the situation since I held a responsible position in the party.

Thus, during the period of the ban, I thought about the reasons why the situation should have turned out that way. I also thought that, If I am able to engage in politics again, we need new political activities based on the criticisms and precise analyses of our merits and demerits so that we do not repeat past foolishness.

I have also written some miscellaneous essays occasionally which I am preparing to publish as a collection under the title of "The Season of Drifting."

Choe: Since the ban suddenly limited me, who had been engaged in politics, I felt not only something missing and disappointed but also regretful because the ban restricted activities all at once, although it was said that I could do any other activities. I only read books, without leaving home at all. Incidentally, have we ever had time to read books and reflect upon ourselves? So, this might be a little bit beautified expression, but I think the period of ban was a good training time for me. But I stayed up at night until dawn several times when I had mixed emotions.

Having continued such a life for a while, I began to realize that I should not live like that. So I began to visit Buddhist temples, as I am a Buddhist. I learned a lot from it. When I was involved in politics, I had not practice Buddhism sincerely as a Buddhist disciple, being a Buddhist only in name. During the period of the political ban, I visited many places across the nation, from famous temples or praying houses to a small hermitage. Paying visits to temples, I learned about nature and practiced my Buddhist spirit... I think I somehow was a sincere Buddhist. And my hobby, calligraphy, seems to have improved since I often practiced it, although it still is not so satisfactory. After all, although the past 3 years were economically hard, I learned a great deal mentally.

Thicker Wall of Political Reality Than Thought

Cho: Listening to what you three are saying, I have some strange feelings. Even before 17 May, there was sometimes an extreme confrontation due to the split political positions of government party and opposition party, although we were not the main characters, but now I feel that the two parties have become quite similar (everyone laughs). I feel that the political positions of government and opposition party are similar after all.

I had worked as a newspaper reporter for 25 years before I started my political career. I worked as an assemblyman only for about 1 year, but received about 3 yrs of political ban, which makes three times of punishment (laughter).

I have stayed in Seoul all along. I established a publishing company named "Ch'ang In Sa" on Kwang Hwa Moon Street and published about 20 books.

Choe: I have also been publishing a monthly journal called THOUGHTS OF BUDDHISM since December last year. There are many missionary journals on the orientations of Christianity, but I have always felt shame about the lack

of journals on Buddhism in the midst of constant power struggle of Buddhist organization, so I came to take over the task as something I should do as a Buddhist disciple. But once I got into the publication area, there were numerous difficulties, but I feel rewarded.

Cho: I felt several things during the ban period. When I started being involved in politics, it was around the end of the Republican government. At that time, I judged that the situation facing the Pak regime would not last long. That is, I saw that the opportunity for the opposition party or civilian political force to become the main political force would come. It was the same feeling I had had earlier while I was covering the 19 April incident as a reporter.

While covering the 19 April revolution, I thought that there would not appear anyone who would think of exercising a dictatorship in this country, as the autocracy was demolished by the tremendous force of the people. It was an innocent thought. And then, looking at the collapse of the Pak regime after 26 October, I thought that soon civilian politics might be realized, since great lessons were repeated a couple of time. I further thought that I would get myself some great job, as I had just got into politics.

But the wall of reality, or something I might call a limitation of reality, was much thicker and more harsh than I had thought. What I thought in the 3 years was that we must face up to the limitation of reality, that is, our political situation, clearly, before we distinguish between right and wrong. Some of my foreign friends I had met in the past also gave me similar advice. Thus, if I gained anything in the past, it was my broadened political knowledge which had been naive and inexperienced.

Labeling "Old Politicians" Is Not Proper

Moderator: I heard that you had been abroad. Did you feel anything different from the time when you visited as an assemblyman or as a public officer and as a civilian?

Sin: There is a big difference. Before, when I made a so-called "visit," I just gave a cursory glance at surfaces, but this time I looked for every corner and met people, from which I felt the essences which I had never been able to catch.

I have just thought of something from what Assemblyman Cho said. Relatedly, I studied for a year and a half in the United States, from which I realized that I had not known the United States at all. Even though it was my first visit to the United States, I realized that the fact that we, particularly the politicians like me, did not know about the United States at all in such an environment as ours is like not knowing about reality. This is an unnecessary addition, but if I got any benefit from my life in America, it was that I also had time to observe the father country and myself.... As I mentioned briefly earlier, in fact, the opportunity was really lacking until then. I also stopped over in Japan and observed every corner of the country, which also was a good experience to figure out how they became such a great country economically, how they conduct democracy, and where the latent energy lies.

Pak: I also studied a bit in the United States, which gave me an opportunity to view my own nation objectively. Also, I might want to say that I learned to overcome my feeling of loneliness in a foreign country, which I think was useful to me. Also, watching the agonies of the immigrant brothers in the United States, I thought about what I could do for them.

Choe: I also have been to the United States and Japan, an opportunity arranged by my juniors because I was jobless. Anyhow, it was very useful in that I could look around calmly.

Moderator: By the way, the institutional political circle or the press classify you as the old politicians or the people relieved of ban, what do you think about that labeling?

Cho: If an old politician gets trust again through election, then is he going to become a new politician? (everyone laughs).

Sin: But I was originally "new"...(everyone laughs).

Choe: We might have been old politicians during the ban period, but now that the ban is lifted, we have to be relieved of the label. Although there might be a distinction between inside and outside of the Assembly, the word "old" must be removed.

Banning Political Activities Is a Restriction of Natural Right

Moderator: In our political history, there were approximately five periods of restriction measures to limit civil rights or political activities. It was twice though when looked at on a large scale. There were a measure to prohibit pro-Japanese people from public employment after the Liberation, or a restriction measure of the Special Commission for Anti-National Activities, and a measure for limiting civil rights during the period of Democratic Government, however, these measures were not that influential in the area of politics. Among the restriction measures based on retroactive law going through the period of big political upheavals, those which created a stir in the political area were the measure by the purification law and after 16 May the present measure. Having listened to what every one of you said, I feel that you all seem to have spent the ban period to good advantage, but what do you think about the ban itself?

Sin: I tried to abide by the law sincerely after the ban was once confirmed as a positive law. Of course, I did not do it thinking that sincerity would bring about an early lift. Also, abiding by the law does not mean submission to the law itself. I personally reflected on the consequences, though. Is it not better not to have a ban than to have one?

Pak: In principle, a ban is not good. Men cannot live apart from society, and to be involved in political activities or to serve the public is a God-given human right and natural right. It is in principle against justice that these rights were suspended by a certain specific group of people who are holding political power.

Also, if a ban must be unavoidably made after having considered every aspect, it ought to be a ban by the people's judgment following the democratic procedure. Of course, I also tried to abide by the law, although it was a bad law, because it was a positive law....

Cho: Although I also was one of the people on the ban who tried to observe the positive law, as a general rule, it is hard to agree with a law which limits political activities. As has just been said, it was a measure to suppress the natural rights, but is it not common that this kind of measure is constrained by a retroactive law? Originally a retroactive law is to deal with war criminals after war, and should not be enacted to limit political activities. If used in such a manner, the stability of society will be impaired even before one considers the circumstances of those who are affected by such a law. Because no one will be able to act feeling safe if he is going to be frequently punished according to the law which was not effective during his action.

Choe: Since the Republican government did good as well as bad jobs, I wished that the next government, after President Pak's death, would take over and supplement the existing course of national policy without attempting to bring about a big change. Thus, I even appealed to Buddhists to support the new constitutional law prior to the national election as I was then president of the National Buddhists Association after 17 May. I also held large meetings on the city and district levels. In spite of all this, I was included in the ban list. Of course, the soliciting of support was not meant to ask for a favor to me in return, but was to get over the confused situation of that time as soon as possible. But who among those on the ban list would think that it was good to be on the ban? However, I accepted the fact that I was on the ban. Because I thought that when the reins of government were being destroyed, anyone who had worked for the government must be responsible in one way or another.

I think that I led a sincere life as a person on the ban. Even when I visited my ancestral graves in the countryside, I went up there early in the morning and came right back to Seoul, concerned that I might cause trouble for others. I felt sorry for the old friends or many of those who helped me a lot, though.

Prompt Release of Those Who Are Still on Ban Is Wished

Sin: Although the restriction measure itself was wrong in principle, we must think about how it happened. On this problem, I have come to think that we may be basically lacking in tolerance. What politics means is to make people have an affluent life and feel togetherness, but when we look closely at our political history, there seems to have been a lack of tolerance and embracement. And, as Assemblyman Cho pointed out, our politicians were lacking in knowledge of the reality of Korean politics and had excessive desires, I might say, to achieve a goal too fast, both of which seemed to have resulted in the ban situation. It was also true that wisdom was lacking in politicians.... Anyhow, from now on, it is my wish not only that this kind of

thing should never happen again in the future, but also that the people who are still on the ban be released as soon as possible, if the government can show the intention of generosity and reconciliation at long last.

Pak: I agree with you. This kind of thing should never happen again. As it is time to emphasize reconciliation and unity, the ban on the remaining politicians must be lifted from the perspective of strengthening national power. And there has always been the phenomenon of weeding out the old order whenever a new order was established through a certain political movement, that is, a political change or coup d'etat, or revolution. However, although there might be some resistance or challenges, it seems necessary that a foundation for embracing the old order within a new order must be established. Only then can the new order take root in the public.

Choe: Once when Chakong asked Confucius for the lessons of life, the answer was to forgive, and the same thing applies to politics. As Minister Sin said, the spirit of forgiveness is needed.

Cho: I do not see this present ban lift as the second one, but as the third one. In the first place, the lift of those who ran for the 11th antional election was the first one. And I personally feel uneasy to be participating in the roundtable talk like this when many others are still on the ban. And officially, since now the government has entered into a politically very stable period, and thus the goal of the law for political restriction can be seen achieved to a certain degree, I wish that the fourth ban lift be made as soon as possible to release those 99 people who are still on the ban.

The Need To Nurture a Force for Political Succession and Political Power

Moderator: You four people have said that although the political ban was not desirable, you accepted the unjust restriction in principle with the attitude that "a bad law is also a law," but now the question is how past politics should have brought about such a consequence. You said that you were reflecting upon the past, then what do you think was the specific error of the past politics, or what was the reason for it to be judged as "old politics"?

Sin: I am reflecting in my present position, but that does not mean that everything was wrong. There are also many things I am proud of. Thus the meaning of "reflection" also must be interpreted in that way. Anyhow, there are many things which need to be examined in past politics. First of all, a politician should have his own belief and courage with which he can advise a ruler or a supreme authority based on his belief, which are the most important virtues, but I was not able to advise when I should have. I think that the misfortune of the Republican Party was caused by the lack of this courage, but the courage to advise seems to diminish as time goes by and as your secular position gets higher and higher. Accordingly, I have realized that one must acquire the courage to advise as he remains elected for an assemblyman over several years, as one gets older and older, and as one's position gets higher and higher in a party and in a public office. I also have thought that if we had had the courage to advise candidly, there might not have been

the misfortunate political history. Although this kind of honest advice is harsh to the ear, there needs to be a ruler who has the generosity to listen, but the more important thing is one's courage to make him listen.

From the past examples, I felt that a shift of political power was needed. As a matter of fact, in the past, when the opposition party complained that the government party was holding power too long, I thought why not maintain it longer as they are doing a good job. But I no longer think that way. It was wrong thinking. Of course, although the political shift in which the government party becomes the opposition party or vice versa could not be achieved arbitrarily, the atmosphere for a peaceful shift of political power must be cultivated.

Moderator: It would have been very good if you had thought so in the past...
(laughs)

Sin: That is right. I was the realization after the fact, which I am really reflecting upon. One thing that concerns me is the situation of our security. Thus, within the boundary of not creating any trouble, there should be a way for a peaceful shift of political power.

Pak: Our political history has been such that a new political power did not emerge without a politically turbulent period. It is true that there were negative aspects to the old political powers. To have a normal political process, it is necessary for politicians to have clear political ideas or political philosophies. It seems to me that the older order had to be overthrown because of the lack of political ideas and philosophies. In my opinion, the logic of harmony and coexistence must be a part of political philosophy, that is a yardstick to measure politics, but when we look into the past, there were some people who think as if the process and procedure of democracy were a waste of national power. In this kind of situation, the supply capacity of a party was paralyzed, the ability to think became rigid, and excessive loyalty resulted. It seems that all these combined factors brought about the unfortunate end of the government.

Cho: In my opinion, the biggest blind spot was that a strata which took over the political power was not mature in the past. There have been three times of big change of political power since the Liberation. But, is it not true that the so-called opposition parties came into being only after the governments were established? Accordingly, it has been the case that the core of the political power in the past 40 years since the Liberation has been outside the party. Thus, although it is a sorry thing to say to those who have been in the government party, one becomes naturally skeptical about whether they have played a main role or not. In other words, the main power in the government party who can take charge of politics could not grow.

Now, speaking of the opposition party, the opposition party of this land has been an opposition party for 40 years since the Liberation, which has never had the experience of transfer of power in shifts.

Sin: They have got it once, have they not? (laughs)

Cho: The Democratic Party was established owing to the 19 April Student Revolution, and it is hard to say that it took charge of political power well enough, because the duration of the power was very short and was in a state of disorder. Anyhow, as there were both no opportunity to participate in politics and no experience, it seems that participation of able people was lacking. That it seemed as if one was riding on a cart when the other was taking a jet.... As it continued in that manner, it even developed to a point where there was doubt whether the opposition party could have the capacity for the administration of the state which had become vast and maintain it even if they were given the power by the people. After all, since there had been no politics, but only controlling since the Liberation, it cannot but be described that the practice was lacking as a force to be in charge of political power.

Core of Power, Outside of Political Party and the Assembly

Choe: This might be a rather trite expression, but I felt that Assemblymen of my father's day when he was working as an Assemblyman until the Third National Assembly were very patriotic. They cared for the nation, not just about their own individual security and that of their family. But now, that spirit and dignity seems to have very much disappeared. If assemblymen are the spokesmen of national interests and the welfare of the people, they must learn that kind of attitude. Until now, despite the fact that the people were not so satisfied with the attitude of politicians and Assemblymen, the reason that the people acknowledge them was due to the understanding of difficulties such as the South-North confrontation. We should not disappoint these people.

Also, the government party has strong power in actuality, but an opposition party must be nurtured. You might say that a party is established and developed by the support of the people, and ask what I am talking about by speaking of nurturing and so forth, but is that not a reality? Of course, the opposition party must develop its own strength and also avoid maintaining an extreme confrontation.

Only then will a party survive a long history, even if the men disappear, which will be an indicator of the development of democracy in our country.

Cho: As I mentioned briefly earlier, I think the tasks of politicians are a clear understanding of reality, acceptance of the reality, and looking for ways to improve. Accepting the reality is an expression which can possibly create a lot of misunderstanding, but it is true that our politicians themselves have talked about many unrealistic matters beyond their own capability. In my case, although my political career was short, I could not help being conscious of popularity, which may be the nature of election, thus sometimes I talked about unrealistic things without much substance. Of course, ideals must be set up, but then there emerges a gap between the ideals and reality.

Politicians in the past, especially those of the opposition party, had a tendency to ignore reality. Of course, the politicians are not wholly responsible for that. Because in our case, politics could not solve everything. If the core of the political power exists outside the party and the Assembly, which are the so-called converging places of the will of the people, how could politics in a real sense possibly be realized? Thus, as many people accept, if we cannot act and express as we wish by participating in politics, and if we are in a reality where we cannot ignore or abandon politics, I rather suggest we accept this plainly.

Even when I myself was an Assemblyman, even though I did not have much expectation, such a National Assembly is of course better than nothing. To conclude, what we must do is to aim not only at great goals, but to achieve even small steps carefully toward the goal of a blooming democracy.

An Attitude With Reserve for the First Step to the Solution Needed

Pak: The economic situation also sets a limit to politics. In the past, we have maintained an economic policy for high development which was based on the strategy of low wages and low prices of grain, but the policy required domestic security which brought about some limitation of freedom. However, now we cannot have a policy to slow the economic growth, can we? Because the problems such as employment and foreign loans will appear. It is a situation in which the same economic development pattern will have to continue, but then it will follow that the restriction will also continue. We cannot but accept such a limitation in a situation like this in which we cannot choose the opposite just because the present economic policy is bad.

Cho: What is politics? Is it not to pursue a concerted line through discussion and compromise among the people with different understandings? For that, I think it is necessary to have an attitude which pursues ideals by looking into concrete problems without being too much concerned about big ones. To make this possible, it is needless to say that the generosity of the government party is indispensable.

In 1968, I had an opportunity to observe the convention of the Democratic Party in Chicago. Senator Eugene McCarthy was a candidate then. The support for him in the public opinion poll was only 3 percent. In the press interview, the reporters asked him, "Are you running for the Presidency really expecting that you have a possibility to win when the support for you is only 3 percent," then he answered, "There is no way I can win the Presidency."

"Then, why are you working so hard?" when asked again, he said "I am not a politician, but a political educator." "Then who do you want to educate by running?" He answered, "The two-party system of Republican Party and Democratic Party of America has become too old to absorb all the political desires. There should be a third method. Because politics became separated from the people, the young men are giving up their votes and challenges. Thus, absorbing them is the way to activate politics, and I am only borrowing the stage as a candidate to tell that." I saw that interviewing reporters were impressed and were applauding. It has a great deal of implication for us.

Choe: It seems that we have a tendency to deal with business impatiently. The attitude of solving from the first step with reserve and patience seems necessary. Of course, it should not be the same as enervation, or "sakura".... And to speak for the opinion of the people truly, the qualification of the Assemblymen is also an important problem. This could be solved by considering it in the process of public nomination and of a national referendum, but the attitude of running for the National Assembly not because they are qualified but because they made some fortune should be eradicated.

Statesmanship is also needed for the Assembly to become a real hall of the people's will. Are we not treated like children when we attend the conference for the Federation of Korean-Japanese Assemblymen? Passion of youth is not the only important factor.

The Need To Trust People and Recognize More Self-governing Spirit

Moderator: You have reflected upon the past and also suggested prescriptions for the future, now I am very curious about how the present politics appears to you. As mentioned earlier, there is a saying that there is no politics, I believe that you must have some kind of opinions. Also the opinions of leading politicians who have had unique suffering experiences must be good references to those who are presently in charge of politics. What do you think?

Sin: Although it might be a little bit sorry to talk about present politics as a past politician, I can say a few words considering the erroneous experiences of the past. First of all, we must look at the whole rather than the details. That is, an overall attitude is needed. Also, the attitude of trusting people in politics is necessary. In my thought, our people are very good, great, and have potential, but it seems that nowadays the people are not always viewed in this way. Although social purification of something of that sort is necessary, it may sound as if the people are not good.

Politicians Must Endeavor To Develop Democracy

Choe: I have a similar thought. I think that the cores of politics are economy, security and trust, that is, trust in the people, but when we look at our political history since the Liberation, the trust of people has always been a problem. Although it still can be pointed out as a problem, the ban lift and the measure for academic autonomy in this new spring seem to be progressive steps in this respect....

In relation to this, the scale of generous man, or the big scale, I might call it, is the attitude that is more concerned about major issues than minor affairs. In other words, it is a question of statesmanship. It seems to me that people in the government are working hard and that everything is getting in order despite some confusion in the process of consolidating power at the start. However, due to a large-scale turnover of people and replacement of them by young people with little experience in many areas, my feeling is that there arise some friction in the smooth solution of issues. I also used to be challenging seniors or whoever, being full of ambition when I was young, but now I feel that I was wrong. Indeed experience is an important thing.

Even with the National Assembly, it would be desirable to harmonize by including many experienced and mature senior members even though one cannot do much about it, as the members are elected.

Thirdly, the government has been implementing desirable measures such as giving autonomy in dealing with academic problems, and they also must allow the press autonomy. They can be responsible for themselves even if they are left in autonomy, can they not? If these several points were to be improved, the so-called image of a new era would be brighter. Lastly, as Assemblyman Cho has mentioned, the authorities can take confident measures since government power is now stabilized.

Cho: Democratic politics requires spontaneity such as maturing of people as well as of the ruling strata, but I sometimes wonder if our political pattern looks too much patriarchal. It cannot be an ideal politics if the state administers everything. The problem of morality cannot be supervised by the government, can it? A chance to display spontaneity, rather than excessive administration, must be given to the people. As Minister Sin said before, it means that we must trust the capability of the people. Only then can we accomplish democracy.

Also, democracy is not just a political term. Now has not even the economy reached the point where it can no longer totally belong to the state administration? We have to keep in mind that all the economically advanced countries are the countries where democracy is flourishing.

Pak: It may not be appropriate to say something as a person who is not directly involved in politics, but I want to let those who profess a will to reform, know that nobody opposes the idea of reform, but that we must consider the desires of the people by standing beside them and by broadening their perspectives further.

Also as frequently pointed out, the politicians are expected to make greater endeavors for the expansion of democracy as much as is allowed, despite the limited condition of political reality such as the situation which a developing country like ours is facing.

Politics--Something That Is Hard To Shun

Moderator: You four people are now standing in a desolate field of politics again, having been deprived of all the things you have had, for the reason that you had participated in politics. In this situation, I wonder if you are going to be involved in politics again, and if so, you will need to get a new house [party] having lost the old house [party], how do you think about that? Many people seem to be curious about how you think.

Cho: In the position of being forced to get off on the way by others' will, I would like to ask the people about their confidence. Although I would like to be engaged in the front of politics, the specific problems such as choosing a party need to be discussed with other colleagues whose ban was also lifted, so I will probably be able to answer the question a little bit later. I think that for the development of democracy of our nation, establishing a checking force in the position of opposition party is more effective. I can only say that much, is it good enough?

Choe: I think that I probably will have to be engaged in politics as I am a politician who aspired to follow my own philosophy. However, there were 3 years of political vacuum...now I just wait and see. If I have to be in politics, my thought is that one has to be engaged in a party, but which one I should choose probably needs more thinking and discussion.

Pak: In my case also. I hope to act together with other colleagues relieved of the ban to achieve the common goal of development of democracy as best I can. The problem such as choosing a party is still too early to consider, since it is not long since the ban was lifted..., so it is hard to say something now.

Sin: Assemblyman Choe talked about an image of politicians before, now I think that politicians must be modest and honest. That is the essence of it. But to be like that, one must not have self-interest, but have courage to commit himself to the ideas of love of nation and of people. I think that if I have such a spirit of unselfishness and courage, I can get into politics again.

There is another reason for my desire to be in politics, which is clarifying President Pak's merits and demerits. It is my strong wish that everything he had done can be clarified in our history.

For now, I am not thinking of being an independent. Independence has not contributed that much to the development of Korean politics, and it is more effective by affiliating with a party for the development of politics.

It is hard to tell now which party I would choose as there needs to be discussions with other colleagues, but I can tell you about one thing now, that is, I will choose an opposition party. It is because from my experience as a member of the government party for a long time, I reflect that I had no time to examine the situations probably due to the busy life, and could not listen to the people's voice well. Also because the power-oriented attitude that always follows after the government party all the time does not seem to be good either...and one other reason is that by joining the opposition party, I might be able to recognize the past mistakes much faster and more clearly.

Politics Should Not Be Abandoned

Moderator: You have said that you are going to restart the political career in the future, and I think, at this juncture, you must have many things to say.

Sin: What can we talk about at this early point? Would you, Assemblyman Cho, say something on behalf of us?

Cho: How can I represent you? (laughs) The biggest problem at present is that there is a big gap in perceiving the reality between the politicians regardless of their parties and the people, especially those of the younger generation. I think the task of politicians is how to stop this gap. My special request to intellectuals on this occasion is not to give up politics even if the political situation is unsatisfactory and in disorder. There is even a

tendency to talk about politics indifferently, since everyone has felt tired with and tired of and bitter about politics, which is understandable, but I should like to say that politics is not a matter that can be abandoned. Although I fully realize that the politicians have a great responsibility for such a consequence, since politics is like air, if it were polluted, should everyone stand idle, or clean it up together?

Moderator: I really appreciate that you have expressed your feelings plainly for a long time, despite your position in which you cannot easily discuss your ideas frankly when it has not been long since the ban was lifted. The time has not come yet for you to express your future plans explicitly, and the formation and the flow of the atmosphere of the political circle are unknown. Assemblyman Cho said before that you all have come to have similar feelings after the sufferings, although we do not know in what position each one of you is going to be in the future, we wish a political climate in which everyone expresses himself frankly like today's roundtable meeting can be established. Thank you all.

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S. KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

DJP PROPOSES 108 PROJECTS FOR IMMEDIATE CORRECTION

Seoul SEOUL SINMUN in Korean 15 Jul 84 p 1

[Text] On 14 July, the DJP [Democratic Justice Party] proposed that 108 projects become targets for immediate correction in order to increase benefits for the people and to resolve public discontent. These propositions were based on the result of studies of potential weak areas and noted public grievances. The studies were conducted by various public organizations and were received by the party and the executive branch of the government.

According to the above statement, urban water shortages will be completely solved by 1966 as a result of the expansion of the public water system. By the end of the 1980's the public water system will be expanded to every town and village nationwide, and additional public waterworks will be added to solve water shortages of the high altitude region.

In addition, the evacuation of buildings without building permits can only be carried out after a relief plan is prepared, and problems connected with faulty [subsidized] houses and damages caused by defective construction shall be corrected immediately.

Other projects, such as legalization of employment security to protect the handicapped whose employment opportunities are limited, are the improvement of regulations to assist people whose personal property is adversely affected by urban expansion plans, compensation for hindrance to the quality of life in the community and peaceful atmosphere caused by pleasure-seeking businesses, and compensation for the ill effects of pollution such as the contamination of water reservoirs and atmospheric pollution. Still other projects include the improvement of protection facilities against pollution, the completion of a direct dial telephone system in all the islands by 1986, the expansion of roads, bridges, and harbors, the development of passengership routes, and the expansion of primary medical facilities such as health clinics. All of these are being planned to proceed in the near future.

On 14 July, the DJP Disaster Rescue Committee (President--Jaehuk Park) delivered 36,000,000 won as a rescue fund to 15 districts including BUAN, Keumjae District, Chunbuk Province, which suffered flooding caused by the monsoons.

This fund is categorized into four levels according to the level of damage and will be used to compensate for physical and material damage.

On 14 July, the DJP announced that through the course of the 12th national elections they are going to show political integrity and intentions for reform. They are extensively eliminating the remainder of the unsavory elements of the previous period, and are accelerating the absorption of political power of politicians who participated with the fifth republic.

The DJP concluded that the grievance scandal, which greatly damaged the party image, was caused by the lack of expertise in eliminating the old custom of the accumulation of wealth. The DJP is known to be strengthening the reform participation force of the initiation period and eliminating the wealthy politicians from the elections list.

The DJP also decided on the political employment regulation, admitting that the grievance scandal has had negative effects on the party's image. However, the DJP also believes that this incident will lead to the complete departure from the partial attachment to the accumulation of wealth, which was inevitable in the beginning.

According to the DJP, a primary election with a detailed self-examination for old-timers in the party is demanded. For regional elections, the DJP is determined to replace the representatives in problem regions while respecting the current members who participated in the fifth republic.

An informed source in the party says that regardless of the faithful contributions to the party or the high possibility of election, if a problem is found in the area of political integrity and reform intent, the politicians concerned will be inevitably eliminated in the elections for the sake of the completion of political integrity of the Fifth Republic.

It is also said that in relation to the possibility of reelection of present members who participated in the 11th National Assembly, the recent integrity/reform movement should never be understood as a dimension of an injured party. However, opportunities for the reunification, and possibilities for the reelection of new politicians after the launching of the Fifth Republic are expected to increase.

On the other hand, the DJP is reexamining the internal election operation which has progressed to a high level and will be replacing the current representatives if their integrity is questionable.

12709

CSO: 4207/201

S. KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DEBATES ON LOCAL AUTONOMY ISSUE

Seoul HANKGUK ILBO in Korean 5 Jul 84 p 3

[Article by reporter Yi I-ch'un: "Local Self-Governance Issue Leads to Break in Four Day Stalemate"]

[Text] The continuously stalemated 122d extraordinary session of the National Assembly made a breakthrough when the Democratic Justice Party (DJP) relaxed its intransigence and showed some flexibility on the local self-governance issue which was the main cause of the stalemate.

This extraordinary session of the National Assembly, which barely found a way to resolve the stalemate through behind-the-curtains contacts and frequent official meetings between the ruling party and the opposition parties, had much potential for stalemate when it opened on 25 June.

The Democratic Korea Party (DKP), which had introduced a number of political bills such as the local self-governance and the basic press law revision bills at the beginning of the 11th National Assembly, saw the June National Assembly as its last opportunity for political compromise on its political bills and established a guideline for developing an all-out struggle.

Also, the Korean National Party (KNP), which had introduced many political bills similar to the DKP bills, adopted the same stance in order to reinforce its image as an opposition party for the 12th general elections.

Thus the floor leadership of the KNP and the DKP seized every opportunity to threaten to boycott the meetings of the standing committees unless the political bills were dealt with first.

In fact, after stalemating the "first day of Standing Committee meetings" on 30 June, Floor Leader Im Chong-ki of the DKP set forth preconditions, saying, "We must resolve the political bills held up in each Standing Committee during the extraordinary session," and passed around instructions to party leaders which said, "The party leaders attached to each Standing Committee must not negotiate committee agendas, but must instead strongly press the ruling party to finish subcommittee activities first."

In the 2 July floor leaders' meeting held to discuss ways to break the stalemate, Floor Leader Kim Chong-ha of the KNP took a strong position when he said, "We will attend Standing Committee meetings only after political bills have been resolved.

As a result, there was an unyielding standoff between the opposition's assertion of "completion of subcommittee consideration of political bills first, normalization of Standing Committees later" and the ruling party's assertion of "concurrent conduct of subcommittee and Standing Committee meetings."

Of course, the floor leaders of the three parties did agree to activate the various subcommittees and over half the subcommittees did hold meetings: however, taking into consideration the difficulty of resolving on the subcommittee level political bills which could not be resolved on the floor leader level, it was clear at the beginning that there could be no breaking of the stalemate in which the three parties refused to yield.

The key to resolving this standoff between the ruling party and the opposition, which nearly paralyzed the political scene, was found during 2 days of successive floor leader meetings and unofficial contacts between party heads on 3 and 4 July.

It is known that in the process the DJP promised to "reveal the timing and the scope of the implementation of the local self-governance system in the regular National Assembly session in September."

The DKP had been calling for the disposition of five political bills but it could not ignore the temptation of the DJP's promise since the area it had stressed most was the local governance system.

Even so, the DKP did not immediately accept the DJP promise because it is aware of opinion within the party which holds that it would be inconsistent to attend Standing Committee meetings solely on the basis of a promise to "reveal the time and the scope of the implementation of the local self-governance system at the regular National Assembly session in September" when the DKP has been demanding just that all along.

However, the DKP—which must gain the political advantage of a revision to the National Assembly election law in this session—is not in a position to continue to stalemate the Standing Committees.

As a result, it appears that the DKP is forced to move in the direction of normalizing the Standing Committees because of its commitment to a revision of the National Assembly election law.

It was in this regard that the KNP also held a sudden general meeting of its assemblymen in the morning of 4 July where it decided in principle to attend the Standing Committee meetings but to leave the timing up to the floor leader. This decision by the KNP reflects its calculation that if the Standing Committees continue in stalemate the blame can be put on the DJP and the DKP and that if the Standing Committees ultimately never even get started it will suffer no damage.

However, the KNP's decision to attend the Standing Committees aroused the DKP and is seen as a factor operating to normalize the National Assembly.

Also, in the case where the Standing Committees are boycotted to the end, the KNP leadership will have to bear the responsibility for the stalemate; the party is also concerned whether the people will support a boycott of the Standing Committees.

Ever since the Chong Nae-hyok incident broke, the DKP has wanted to avoid handling the complex Chong problem in the National Assembly and, accordingly, does not want the Chong problem to be spotlighted and analyzed from various angles by the Standing Committees concerned. Thus, the DJP has had its own desire for the Standing Committees to continue to not meet, and in some sense they may even be grateful for the DKP boycott of the Standing Committees.

As a result, it is expected that the DKP leadership will recognize the argument from within the party that its boycott of the Standing Committees has actually played into the DJP's hand.

At the same time, the decisive tilting of the DKP and the KNP toward normalizing the Standing Committees is also due to the parties' awareness that the people are anticipating that the Chong problem be discussed more actively as a political issue than the election law or the local self-governance system. [as printed]

The opposition parties have a habit of demanding moral justification rather than practical benefit in order to normalize the National Assembly when it is stalemated.

At this point in time it appears that although they are not satisfied, the DKP and the KNP are reaching for both practical benefit and moral justification. Thus it is their judgment that if the National Assembly is stalemated any longer, the DKP will be the party to bear the full responsibility; this judgment led to the breakthrough.

However, the DJP must realize that having to stalemate the National Assembly in order to get a commitment on the local self-governance system is no different from taxi drivers having to hold mass demonstrations in order to reduce their payments to their companies.

9137

CSO: 4107/192

N. KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

LOYALTY TO PARTY AND LEADER URGED

Pyongyang NODONG CH'ONGNYON in Korean 5 Jul 84 p 1

[Editorial: "Let Us Display Aloft Our Loyalty to the Party and Leader in the Socialist Economic Construction"]

[Text] Presently the whole country is excited with boundless inspiration and joy for the great leader of our party and our people, marshal Kim Il-song, who has returned from his historic trip abroad with ever-lasting accomplishments.

The recent foreign trip of our beloved and respected leader, marshal Kim Il-song, was embellished with enthusiastic respect and admiration. Promotion of strong traditional friendship and solidarity among the socialist countries is the shining contribution made by our leader, who has dedicated himself to bringing about the great socialist achievements and the development of the communist movement.

Through the historic trip of our beloved and respected leader, Marshal Kim Il-song, our people's dignity and pride were kept even more firmly under the leadership of our dear leader Comarade Kim Chong-il. With the great prestige of our great leader, our people and youth have greatly enhanced their fiery loyalty to the party and the leader.

From the first day of our great leader's foreign trip, our people and youth generated a revolutionary upsurge for socialist construction, by faithfully following the leadership of our dear leader and comrade Kim Chong-il. Thus, they made the great leader's foreign trip even more meaningful, and strongly displayed the indomitable power of our people, who are solidly united around the party and the leader.

During our great leader, marshal Kim Il-song's tour of foreign countries our people and youth were overjoyed with a feeling of longing and adoration to see the affectionate image of our fatherly leader in newspapers and on television, and were most interested in following his day by day itinerary and all other events during the trip.

Moreover, the minds of our people and youth worked in unison in following the itinerary of our great leader's foreign tour, in counting the days before the return of our fatherly leader, and in preparing a gift for him, representative of our loyalty and hard work, which would please him.

Our dear leader and comrade Kim Chong-il, who considers making the great leader happy to be the most noble duty, provided on-the-scene instruction for various sectors of the people's economy, effected revolutionary measures, and led our people and youth forcefully, to bring about a new upsurge in socialist economic construction.

By highly displaying the passion of loyalty at every battlefield, and by upholding the superior intention of our dear leader and comrade, our people and youth have brought about a major reform in every field and every unit, beginning with industry and the rural economy.

In the process, we have realized, more firmly than ever, how great our dear leader and Comrade Kim Chong-il is, and we have reaffirmed from our hearts that the unending prosperity of our fatherland, and the everlasting happiness of our people are possible only when we are loyal to the leadership of the party.

It is our young people's iron-like resolve and will to march forcefully on the only road of loyalty, with boundless revolutionary integrity and pride, and with great esteem for our great leader marshal Kim Il-song, under the leadership of our dear leader and Comrade Kim Chong-il.

The entire membership of the Socialist Working Youth League (SWYL) and young people must highly display their loyalty to the party and to the leader, the loyalty which has been built up further in actual struggle for socialist economic construction during the recent historic visit of foreign countries by our great leader marshal Kim Il-song.

It is possible to fully glorify the will of our great leader marshal Kim Il-song, and of our dear leader Kim Chong-il, and to further exalt the prestige of our fatherly leader and our party, when we display aloft our loyalty to the leader in actual struggles for socialist economic construction.

By so doing, we can also solidify the brilliant effects and accomplishments that our beloved and respected leader achieved during the recent foreign tour.

This is the greatest honor and noblest duty for SWYL members and other young people who also belong to the honor guard unit, the do-or-die unit, the personal guard unit, or the shock brigade, which are boundlessly loyal to our great leader marshal Kim Il-song, and to our dear leader and comrade Kim Chong-il.

In order to demonstrate our loyalty to the party and the leader in the actual struggle for socialist economic construction, we must first of all hold fast our people's integrity and pride for having the great leader and the dear leader and comrade, and observe the principle of carrying out party policies absolutely and unconditionally.

Our dear leader and Comrade Kim Chong-il pointed out that "loyalty to the leader and to the party should be reflected in the thorough and unconditional carrying out of our leader's instructions and our party's policies."

Executing thoroughly and without question the party policies and instructions of our great leader marshal Kim Il-song, is the basic requirement for being loyal to the fatherly leader and to the party, and it is the decisive factor in bringing about victory in the revolutionary struggles and construction tasks. Without the instructions of our beloved and respected leader, and without adherence to our party policies, there would be neither a step of advancement, nor any accomplishment. No matter how much one says that one is going to be loyal to the party and the leader, one cannot be loyal to the party unless one accepts unconditionally the party policies and the instructions of our beloved and respected leader, and does his utmost to carry them out to the end.

This year, we have tasks before us--the completion of the second 7-year plan and making epochal progress in realizing the 10 major prospective targets in socialist economic construction during the 1980's.

By giving on-the-scene advice to the various sectors and units of the people's economy, and through his New Year address and speeches delivered at various important meetings, our great leader marshal Kim Il-song has clarified the specific tasks involved in socialist economic construction. His speeches reflected correctly the principles required for the economic development of our country, actual conditions, and our people's directions and desires.

Our dear leader and Comrade Kim Chong-il has shown us the correct directions and methods in realizing the tasks of struggle, as defined by our great leader, in every field and every unit. To execute the tasks, he is energetically organizing and mobilizing the entire party and the people.

Particularly, as he was giving on-the-scene instructions for projects in various sectors of the people's economy in the city of Chongjin and Hambuk and Hamnam provinces recently, our dear leader and comrade showed us the combat tasks necessary for advancing our chuche industries to a higher stage and strengthening their power. He clearly presents the ways to thoroughly carry out the instructions of our respected and beloved leader, to brilliantly execute the people's economic plan of this year and the second 7-year plan, to attain the 10 major prospective targets of socialist economic construction in the 1980's, and to expedite the chucheization, the modernization, and the scientification of the people's economy.

By devoting all the strength and wisdom to the thorough realization of these policies, members of the SWYL and other young people must raise high the flame of a great new revolutionary upsurge.

Especially, members of the SWYL and other young people in the city of Changjin and in the North and South Hamkyong provinces must lead in the struggle for

the thorough realization of the recent policy of our dear leader and comrade, and must render great youthful services.

Achieving breakthroughs by standing in the forefront of difficult, laborious and important fields is always the important task for members of the SWYL and other young people in the socialist economic construction.

Today, the massive struggle for socialist economic construction demands a more forceful struggle by members of the SWYL and other young people.

The members of the SWYL and other young people, who are in full youthful vigor, and who have burning creative passion, are the main force of the working front for socialist construction.

Our party firmly believes in the inexhaustible strength of the members of the SWYL and other young people, and expects a great deal of them.

The members of the SWYL and other young people must actively move into difficult and laborious fields, such as the extraction industry, the rural economy, the construction of dams and power stations, which are essential in realizing the grand design for the long term, the construction of new railroads and the tideland reclamation battlefield. They must energetically launch the activities of the youth shock brigades, and display the heroic spirit of the Korean youth.

Today, our party demands an upsurge in production by focusing on the developments in the railway transportation and extraction industry, and by emphasizing the basic industrial fields, starting with electricity, metals and machines.

The members of the SWYL and other young people in the railway transportation field must dedicate themselves to easing the strained railway transportation industry decisively by moving more cargo through the intensification of the "5.18 no accident, on time, traction--standard surpassing movement," which was led by our dear comrade and leader. The members of the SWYL and other young people in the extraction industry must give top priority to excavation and trip mining projects exactly in accordance with party directives, actively realize the composite mechanization of pitwork, and extract more metals and minerals such as coal, iron, and colored metals.

The members of the SWYL and other young people in the basic industrial fields, including the electrical, metallurgical, and mechanical industries, must inflame enthusiasm for achieving the "speed of the 80's" and increase the production of plant machinery, starting with electrical, iron and steel products, and extraction facilities by taking care of their facilities well and operating every unit of machine facility to its full capacity.

Especially, today, our party is guaranteeing everything, and stressing methods to unprecedentedly raise the standards of material and cultural life of the people.

The members of the SWYL and other young people in the fields of light industries and the chemical industries must keep deep in their hearts the lofty wishes of the party and the leader, operate every plant to its full capacity, produce high quality consumer goods massively like waterfalls, display further the true superiority of the socialist system in our country, and glorify our party's prestige even more.

Also, the members of the SWYL and other young people in the field of rural economy must honor this year, which is the 20th anniversary of the pronouncement of the "Thesis on the Farming Community," as a bumper crop year, by managing well the agricultural produce, which is abundant under the wise leadership of our dear leader and comrade.

In this proud struggle, especially, the role of the youth work teams and the youth sub-work teams must be enhanced even more, and the needs of the chuche agricultural principle must be thoroughly satisfied in the actual management of agriculture.

If loyalty is to be demonstrated in socialist economic construction, the members of the SWYL and other young people must raise the level of technology and technical skills, be thoroughly familiar with the technology of the field of which they are in charge, strengthen the movement for the technical reform of the masses, create new techniques and records, and manage the national administration meticulously.

The members of the SWYL and other young people must enhance their roles as advocates and initiators in introducing new technology by raising their technical standards to suit the needs of reality, and by actively launching the activities of the youth shock brigades for technological innovation, automation, and for the popular technical innovation movement. By doing so at the workplaces of the SWYL members and other young people, the new standards and records, which attract worldwide attention, must be established continuously.

The members of the SWYL and other young people must keep in mind that those who exert themselves to economize on goods and materials as much as possible, and to manage the government efficiently are the true patriots who are loyal to the party and the leader. They must seek out their inner reserves by displaying aloft the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance, and lead others in increasing and improving the production and construction with existing labor, facilities and materials, by stepping up the struggle for the economy.

Now, the members of the SWYL and other young people are filled with the resolve to glorify the results of the historic foreign tour of our great leader, through a stepped-up production upsurge.

By making the young people understand thoroughly the greatness of the beloved and respected marshal Kim Il-song and the dear leader, the organizations of the SWYL must intensify the ideological education task continuously, so that the young people affirm in their hearts their loyalty to the party and to the leader with revolutionary conviction and duty.

Especially with the shining results and indestructible accomplishments of the recent historic foreign tour of the great leader marshal Kim Il-song, the organizations of the SWYL must make their members and other young people understand the greatness of the leader.

At the same time, the organizations of the SWYL must, by explaining, make their members and other young people thoroughly understand the instructions of the great leader, the advice of the dear comrade and leader, and the party policy on socialist economic construction. They effectively plan the organizational political work to enable them to take the leadership for the successful conclusion of the task.

The important thing in displaying loyalty to the party and the leader is to educate members of the SWYL and other young people through living models of loyalty.

By organizing the ideological education task with living examples, starting with the young communists who are boundlessly loyal to the party and the leader, the anti-Japanese revolutionary fighters, the heroic fighters of the fatherland liberation war, and the film heroes and heroines such as the 10 party members in paradise, the organizations of the SWYL must make sure that all its members and other young people march proudly, as shock brigades and vanguard units, in the socialist construction, like those examples, with boundless loyalty to the party and the leader.

Moreover, the organizations of the SWYL must drum-up enthusiasm for economic agitations in the battlefields of the exciting socialist economic construction, energetically launch a variety of economic activities suitable to the mentality of SWYL members and other young people, help promote innovative initiatives from them, and organize and mobilize them in the direction of innovation and great service.

Particularly, by linking the task of heightening displays of loyalty in socialist construction with the struggle to carry out the directives of the Party Central Committee, the organizations of the SWYL must push forward vigorously.

Let the members of the SWYL and other young people glorify the results and the indestructible accomplishments of the historic foreign tour of the great leader by displaying even more their loyalty to the party and the leader, in the actual struggles for socialist economic construction.

12474
CSO: 4110/136

N. KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

UNITING FOR CRUSHING U.S. WAR MACHINATIONS URGED

Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 25 Jun 84 p 4

/Editorial: "Let Us Crush War Machinations of U.S. Imperialism with the United Strength of the Whole Nation and Materialize the Historical Cause of Unification of the Fatherland!"/

/Text/ Upholding the militant tasks set forth in the New Year's message of this year of comrade Kim Il-song, the great leader, and the Party Central Committee's letter to all the party members, all the workers are effecting a grand upsurge in socialist construction. In South Korea, the struggle for the anti-U.S. independence and the antifascist democratization is forcefully being launched. And the international solidarity with the cause of our revolution is further being strengthened. In such an environment as stated above, we are observing "25 June the Day of Struggle Against U.S. Imperialism" today.

In an attempt to wipe out our republic, which had just been founded, at its inception and to turn the whole Korea into their colony, the U.S. imperialist aggressors staged an armed invasion of the northern half of the republic on 25 June 1950.

U.S. imperialism deployed in the Korean front the basic strength of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Forces equipped with the most up-to-date technology, troops of 15 subordinate nations, and the South Korean puppet forces--a stupendous force of several million men altogether--and a tremendous amount of combat technology and materials; and it employed there all the most vicious means and methods of war.

At that difficult time of war when the fatherland and the nation were faced with great danger, comrade Kim Il-song, the great leader, carrying all the heavy burdens of the front and rear in himself, forcefully aroused the whole party, the whole army, and the whole people for the sacred war of annihilating enemies, set forth excellent strategic operational plans at every stage of the war, and led the fatherland liberation war to a solid victory by means of extraordinary art of maneuvering troops.

Our people and officers and men of the people's army, united solidly like an iron drum around comrade Kim Il-song, the great leader, displayed the masses' heroism and matchless courage, annihilated and wiped out the aggressors, and thereby scored a great victory in the fatherland liberation war.

The historical victory in the fatherland liberation war was a brilliant victory won by means of the chuche-oriented military ideology, ever victorious strategy and tactics, and excellent art of maneuvering troops of comrade Kim Il-song, the respected and beloved leader. It was a great victory of our people who were firmly united around the party and the leader. It clearly showed the fact that no force whatsoever can conquer our people who, holding their destiny firmly in their hands under the judicious leadership of comrade Kim Il-song, the great leader, have risen for the freedom and independence of the fatherland.

Under the judicious leadership of comrade Kim Il-song, the respected and beloved leader, our people defeated the U.S. imperialist aggressors in the great fatherland liberation war and defended the fatherland and gains of revolution, safeguarded Asia and world peace, initiated the decline of U.S. imperialism, and set out a new stage of historical development at which the flames of the national liberation struggle and the anti-imperialist, anti-U.S. struggle may forcefully burn all over the world.

Our party and the government of the republic exhausted all their sincere efforts during the 30 years following the war in order to transform the armistice into a solid peace and to reunify the divided fatherland.

However, our people's desire for peace and unification has failed to be materialized because of U.S. imperialism's occupation of South Korea and its policy of aggression.

Comrade Kim Il-song, the great leader, taught us as follows:

"U.S. imperialism concentrated on a large scale great massacre weapons, including the nuclear weapons, in South Korea and its vicinity and has continuously been staging machinations for aggression and war against our republic."

U.S. imperialism has been harboring sinister designs on indefinitely holding South Korea as a colonial military base and on ruling the whole of Korea and Asia by holding South Korea as a bridgehead.

With such sinister designs for aggression sought constantly, U.S. imperialism indeed systematically violated the armistice agreement, increased the U.S. occupational forces in South Korea, and continuously brought in great massacre weapons there. It perpetrated "the Pueblo incident," "the EC-121 incident," and "the Panmunjom incident" and thereby led the situation in our country to the brink of war. In particular, U.S. imperialism, entering the years of the 1980's, declared the Korean peninsula as "a testing ground of the confrontation of strength," continuously brought in the most up-to-date war equippage, including nuclear weapons, and thereby transformed South Korea into a huge war powder keg and a most dangerous nuclear outpost.

U.S. imperialism's reckless war machinations designed to set the fire of a new war in Korea have been more and more naked since Reagan's trip to South Korea in November last year.

U.S. imperialism which has recently deployed anew in South Korea new model tanks and airplanes, missiles, and nuclear land mines, is trying to bring in even the neutron weapons, which are being renounced everywhere in the world, "Pershing 2" medium-range missiles and cruising missiles; and it is scheming to increase the U.S. aggressor forces in South Korea by as many as 2,500 men.

The U.S. imperialist warmongers, openly declaring that they would use nuclear weapons in Korea "at the time of emergency," are trying to put into practice their nuclear war plans which had already been mapped out.

The "Team Spirit 84" war maneuvers are convincing evidence of this.

U.S. imperialism's machinations designed to provoke a new war are growing in their dangerousness while the scheme for forming a triangle military alliance among the United States, Japan, and South Korea becomes open.

U.S. imperialism is giving impetus to the scheme for forming the triangle military alliance in order to set up a military bloc like NATO in Asia, and to mobilize and utilize Japan's territory, economic power, and the armed strength of "the self-defense corps" for the purpose of implementing its policy of aggression and war against Korea and Asia.

Taking advantage of U.S. imperialism's aggressive scheme for forming the triangle military alliance, the Japanese reactionaries are stretching their black devil hands of reinvasion deeply into South Korea in order to make their old dream of "the great East Asian coprosperity sphere" come true.

The Japanese militarists are not only raising a clamor today by saying that they will include the Korean peninsula in the sphere of their military operation and will blockade the Korean Strait "at the time of emergency," but also, even worse than that, are going the length of laying a conspiracy of extending to South Korea the sphere of military action of "the self-defense corps" under the pretext of "joint exercise" with the U.S. occupational forces in South Korea.

The Chon Tu-hwan clique is a most vicious flunkeyist traitors group which is running wild to implement U.S. imperialism's policy of aggression and war.

The Chon Tu-hwan clique, which is maintaining its power under the aegis of U.S. imperialism, offering South Korea as a colonial military base and a ground of war exercises of U.S. imperialism, is whining for the U.S. forces' permanent occupation of South Korea and an increase in military "aid." The clique is bringing in even the Japanese militarists who are scheming to recover their old position of a colonial ruler and is strengthening its political, economical, and military collusion with them.

At the instigation of U.S. imperialism, the Chon Tu-hwan clique is circulating divisionistic plans designed to perpetuate the division of the country, is inspiring the people with the sentiments of north-south confrontation and antagonism by making a vicious anticommunist fuss, and is mobilizing all the manpower and material resources of South Korea for preparation of a war of invasion against the north.

Because of the aggression and war policy of U.S. imperialism and the traitorous acts of the Chon Tu-hwan clique, the national sovereignty is mercilessly being trampled down in South Korea; and a dangerous situation in which a war may break out at any moment is being brought about in Korea.

In an effort to cover up their criminal scheme as cited above, the U.S. imperialists are clamoring about "the menace of invasion of the south" which does not exist, and a kind of "security."

However, "the menace of invasion of the south" and the "security" which are being publicized by U.S. imperialism represent the slogans designed to perpetuate its holding of South Korea as a colonial military base. They are nothing but deceptive schemes employed to rationalize its increase in armed strength and its machinations of preparation for a new war.

U.S. imperialism's occupation of South Korea and its aggression policy are a fundamental cause of the fact that peace is being disturbed and tension is being keyed up in Korea.

Without making U.S. imperialism withdraw from South Korea and without liquidating its colonial rule there, it would be impossible for the people of South Korea to eliminate their status of colonial slaves, or to realize the unification of their country, or to escape the danger of a nuclear war.

Whosoever feels concern about the future destiny of the nation with all his/her heart must forcefully step forward to launch the anti-U.S. independence struggle to make the U.S. imperialist aggressor forces withdraw from South Korea and to liquidate the colonial rule of U.S. imperialism.

The people in South Korea, where the national dignity and sovereignty are being trampled down under the hoof of military occupation of U.S. imperialism and where they are being faced by force with the destiny of colonial slaves, have been forcefully launching the anti-U.S. independence struggle since the Kwangju people's uprising.

The anti-U.S., antifascist struggle being launched forcefully by the youths and students and the people of all circles and all strata in South Korea, where the struggle is effecting more and more upsurge around the occasions of the 24th anniversary of the 19 April people's uprising and of the 4th anniversary of the Kwangju people's uprising, is a manifestation of a firm will which would never allow the colonial military fascist rule of U.S. imperialism and its stooges.

The most urgent, important, and burning problem in resolving the Korean problem today is to eliminate the danger of war, to secure a solid peace, and to find a breakthrough for peaceful unification.

The proposal of the government of the republic made to the effect that a tripartite conference among us, the United States, and South Korea be held, that a peace treaty be concluded at the conference between us and the United States, and that a declaration of nonaggression between the north and the south be adopted at the conference, is a reflection of the demand of such a situation described above.

For the very reason stated above, the political circles and social circles of all nations of the world, including the socialist countries and nonaligned nations, wholeheartedly support our proposal for the tripartite conference and are demanding that the conference be materialized at an early date.

U.S. imperialism must accept, in compliance with the demands of the people of Korea and the peoples of the world, our just proposal for the tripartite conference, must stop at once its hazardous machinations for war, must recall all their lethal weapons and withdraw from South Korea without delay.

The Japanese reactionaries must give up their foolish delusion of carrying out their sinister reinvasion design by supporting the aggression policy of U.S. imperialism, and must stop at once their criminal acts which block the peace in Korea and its peaceful unification.

The South Korean authorities must discard their role of the perpetrator of war for U.S. imperialism, and must make an affirmative response to our proposal for the tripartite conference.

In order to crush the aggression and war machinations of U.S. imperialism and its stooges and to achieve ahead of schedule the independent peaceful unification of the fatherland, it is imperative that the revolutionary forces in the northern half of the republic be strengthened more and more.

All our people, deeply pledging loyalty to comrade Kim Il-song, the great leader, and the glorious Party Center, must hold high the banner of the three revolutions of ideology, technology, and culture, and must forcefully launch the struggle for creating "the speed of the 1980's." They must thereby successfully carry out the second 7-year plan and must effect an epoch-making transformation in achieving the 10 major prospective targets of the socialist economic construction.

Officers and men of the people's army and all the people must further heighten their revolutionary vigilance to cope with the aggression and war machinations, which are being keyed up with every passing day, of U.S. imperialism and its stooges, must safeguard their socialist fatherland like an ironbound fortress always with the tense and mobilized posture, and must further strengthen our revolutionary base politically, economically, and militarily.

Our cause is just and no force whatsoever could block our forward march.

There will always be only victories and glories for our people who are marching forward upholding comrade Kim Il-song, the great leader, and following the judicious leadership of Comrade Kim Chong-il, the dear leader.

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CSO: 4110/130

N. KOREA/ECONOMY

STEPPING UP CRITICAL REVIEW OF PRODUCTION, FINANCING URGED

Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 7 Jun 84 p 3

/Article by Chu Pyong-sun, headquarters reporter: "New Transformation in Critically Reviewing Production and Financing"/

/Text/ Finances are a powerful weapon for stepping up socialist construction. However, during the period under review, the work of financial management has often been regarded as a work that is to be done only by financial bookkeeping functionaries.

However, today all our party members and workers--any one of them--are greatly concerned with the financial management; and every day they are critically reviewing their daily work in conjunction with finances.

This transformation, achieved today in the management of socialist economy and the financial management, was made possible by means of the judicious leadership of our party which set forth an original policy of critically reviewing the work, production and finances and which has been energetically leading the struggle designed to implement the policy.

Comrade Kim Il-song, respected and beloved leader, taught us as follows:

"From now on, the summation of the financial work must be conducted in close conjunction with the summation of the implementation of the national economic plan."

Accurately conducting the summation of the state of affairs of production activities and the financial work in all fields and units of the national economy is of very important significance in improving the economic management and in stepping up the socialist construction.

Our party which is in the vanguard of the socialist economic construction has been deeply concerned with correctly resolving this problem.

In this connection, the guidances which dear Comrade Kim Chong-il conducted on a number of occasions for the Korean Artistic Movie Studio in 1970 carry great significance.

One day Comrade Kim Chong-il thoroughly acquainted himself with the actual state of affairs of the business management and operation of the studio as presented by its functionaries.

Up to that time, functionaries of the studio, regarding a studio as an organization of creative work, paid little attention to the work of economic management; nor did they know how to carry out the work correctly.

The functionary who made a report on such an actual state of affairs was very much awed with a deep feeling of self-reproach.

Then the functionary was given a great thought which would work as a guideline in improving the work of economic management.

.../As things stand/ now, administrative functionaries of the studio are not carrying out the economic management work efficiently. Since they/ are standing aloof from realities and sticking to documents only, it is impossible for them to carry out the work efficiently.

The movie studio is a large production enterprise that makes movies. Therefore, departments and work sites must strengthen the productive connection between them; and they must correctly organize their cooperative operation. Only by doing so can they carry out the work of creating movies efficiently.

In film production, stupdenous labor, materials, and funds must be mobilized. /The film production/ entails a complicated technical process. Therefore, the work of creating movies must be thoroughly organized and standardized so that the personnel of the work may smoothly fulfill their responsibilities at their respective positions....

In this way, the party clearly set forth a brilliant future in which the business enterprise management and operation can be transformed into a work of the masses themselves. Then the party set forth the production group organized to make a movie out of the immortal classical masterpiece "The Destiny of a Member of the Self-Defense Corps" as an example of creating artistic movies and an example of efficiently carrying out financial management work; and the party launched an energetic guidance.

Recalling the glorious day on which the transformation was effected in the business enterprise management and operation under the guidance of the party, the responsible functionary of the Korean Artistic Movie Studio said as follows:

"Despite the fact that he was so busy in the work of the party and the state, dear Comrade Kim Chong-il made many trips along the snow-covered steep roads in the shooting location sites of the Paektu Height. In those days he himself sat with functionaries of the production group and often spent whole nights; and he thus gave warmhearted admonition to them regarding even the compilation of the budget and the method of executing the critically reviewing the budget..

What an imaginative and heartwarming story this is!

The energetic guidance of our Party Center who, not minding late nights and early mornings, is forcefully leading the creative activities and the economic management work of the production group!

It was a process in which he was materializing, in compliance with the intentions of the respected and beloved leader, the ideology of the socialist economic management and the method of the business enterprise management on the basis of the masses' policy line.

The revolutionary leadership of our party which is evolving its work always on the basis of the firm conviction of the inexhaustible strength and creative power of the broad masses is an original source of all the successes and transformations being effected on this land; thus there were resplendent rays of the party and there came about miracles in the work of creating movies.

Upholding the policy of the party, the production group conducted without delay the daily summation of finances, in addition to the creation of movies, with all members of the group participating in it.

Thus the group finished in a short period of only 40 days the work of creating a revolutionary masterpiece which required in the past a long period of time in addition to the provision of a lot of materials and funds.

The dear Comrade Kim Chong-il, who positively proved the superiority of the system of daily financial summation in revolutionary practices, arranged on 6 June 1970 a general meeting of the studio employees designed to make a summation of the financial work of the previous year.

On that day, our functionaries, men of arts, and workers once again came to receive the following great thought:

...As /we/ did when the movie production groups made a movie out of the immortal classical masterpiece "The Destiny of a Member of the Self-Defense Corps," we must make a financial summation every day....

The party policy toward a daily financial summation!

It was a powerful key to enabling all the fields and units to improve revolutionarily the problem of the business enterprise management and operation as well as the problem of overall economic management.

Such a system, established by the party, of daily production and financial summations represents a new summation system which successfully meets the requirements of the socialist economic management regarding the need of having the summation of the implementation of the national economic plan in close conjunction with the summation of financial work.

Revolutionary essentials of this summation system are to be found in the fact that it made the producing masses true masters of the nation's household on the basis of the masses' policy line, and that the business enterprise management and the financial management were firmly transformed into a work of the masses themselves.

This system makes it possible for the creativity and responsibility of the producing masses to be highly displayed in the business enterprise management and operation in conformity with the requirement of the great Taean System. Herein lies one of the originalities of the new summation system established by our party.

The judiciousness of the leadership of the party of the working-class as a guidance force of revolution is to be displayed not only in creating typical examples but also in actively generalizing them.

Our party took some nationwide measures designed to generalize throughout the country the experience of the Korean Artistic Movie Studio.

At this juncture, the organization of training in practical work methods was one of the important contents of those measures.

Until then there had never been a function in which wide-range producing masses participated in making a financial summation in close conjunction with the daily production summation.

In order to make functionaries and producing masses understand the superiority of the new summation system, it was imperative that the training in practical work methods be organized widely.

In compliance with the party policy, organizations concerned sent out their functionaries and organized the training in practical work methods designed to generalize the examples created by the studio.

Thus a nationwide training in practical work methods, in which the administrative and economic functionaries and the financial functionaries of provinces, cities, and counties throughout the country participated, and which was designed to show the methods of making daily production and financial summations, manufactured item-oriented financial summations, and the operation of the Financial Auditing Committee, was conducted.

As in the case with all other matters, achievements in the economic construction and economic management greatly depend on how much concern the party organizations have about the work of this field.

On 15 May 1980, our party took measures designed to make party organizations at all levels further strengthen the party guidance over the matter of implementing the policy toward the new summations.

In accordance with the party measures, the central government organizations, including committees and departments of the Administrative Council, in charge of production, and the party organizations in provinces, cities, counties, plants, and business enterprises conducted an overall critical review of the state of affairs of the implementation of the policy toward the daily production and financial summations; and they mapped out measures designed to display highly the superiority of the summation policy.

This provided an epoch-making momentum of transformation at which all the fields and units of the national economy became capable of highly displaying the superiority of the new summation system which embodies the masses' policy line.

The party guidance for the thorough implementation of the new summation policy did not end there.

In October 1980, the party enunciated that the financial functionaries and the financial bookkeeping functionaries throughout the country, upholding the great leader's programmatic report made at the Sixth Party Congress, must further improve the financial management work in conformity with the demand of the development of realities, must thoroughly implement the policy toward the daily production and financial summations, must step up production and construction, must bring about a grand transformation in the financial management, and thereby must make active contributions in implementing the new prospective plan.

It is our party that once published a book entitled "Daily Production and Financial Summations" to help study principles and saw to it that the book would be distributed widely, and that in 1982, made a scientific educational film entitled "Daily Production and Financial Summations" and saw to it that the film would be shown widely!

Indeed our party saw to it that the revolutionary policy line of the masses would be successfully materialized in the business enterprise management and the socialist financial management in conformity with the demand of the development of realities in which the work of modeling the whole society after the chuche idea was being forcefully stepped up.

This policy which is successfully being implemented in all fields and units of the national economy under the excellent and refined leadership of our party is displaying tremendous vitality.

Functionaries of the Pyongyang Thermoelectric Power Plant, organizing and mobilizing all their employees, regularized power generation, intently sought the reduction of cost, and conducted the daily production and financial summations in conjunction with the independent economic accounting system. As a result, the plant successfully fulfilled the monthly production plans and financial plans during the past 5 years. Thus the plant is priding itself on the fact that it is raising tremendous profits year after year.

In the course of implementing the policy toward the daily production and financial summations, the workers' spiritual and moral life style and work attitude are also being transformed.

Today all functionaries and workers are becoming true masters of the country and men of frugality and ability in their plants and business enterprises, who are concerned with utilization of facilities, the rated capacity of labor, and the material consumption rate, and who are pushing on furiously to increase production, improve the quality of goods, and reduce the cost.

In particular, the new summation system, in conjunction with the problem of thoroughly implementing the independent economic accounting system in conformity with the requirement of the movement to win the red flag of three revolutions and of the Taean work system, organized and mobilized workers to implement decisions and objectives set forth in the movement. Thus the system is positively contributing to the stepping up of the three revolutions of ideology, technology, and culture.

Only when we continuously and thoroughly implement the party policy toward the daily production and financial summations, can we continuously improve economic management in conformity with the requirement of the Taean work system, and can we forcefully step up socialist construction by launching the speed battle.

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CSO: 4110/127

S.KOREA/SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

HIGH-TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES IN AEROSPACE INDUSTRY

Seoul CHUNGANG ILBO in Korean 4 Jul 84 p 5

[Article prepared by reporter Sangdo Kim]

[Text] The aerospace industry can be considered a comprehensive, high-technology industry since it combines advanced technology such as computers and new materials.

Only about 25 countries in the world are currently participating in the aerospace industry, which requires high precision and safety measures. However, the world market for aerospace industry products is rapidly expanding at an annual rate of 15 percent, due to an increase in passengers and freight.

The added value for airplanes amounts to 50 percent, higher than the rate for computers, which is 47 percent, the most advanced products of all high-technology industries. Also, the number of parts for airplanes is of the order of 10^5 when compared to 10^2 parts for bicycles and 10^3 parts for automobiles. This fact implies that airplanes bring far-reaching benefits compared to other products.

Aircraft Industry

The door to a full-scale aircraft industry was opened in April 1976 when Korean Airlines signed a contract with Hughes of the United States jointly to manufacture 500-MD helicopters, based on aircraft maintenance experience accumulated since the airline was turned over to private enterprise in 1969.

Subsequently, Korean Airlines established maintenance depots which could disassemble, modify and repair large cargo planes such as C-130's, helicopters and modern fighter planes such as F-16's. The airline maintained all airplanes of the United States Army, Navy and Air Force in the Pacific area.

The airline also made considerable progress in the production of aircraft parts. In 1981 and 1982, the company exported various parts to Hughes which totaled the equivalent of about 40 helicopters, which included airframes and were worth 4 million dollars.

Following this helicopter production, the airline signed a manufacturing

license agreement with Northrop of the United States for F-5E and F-5F fighter planes. Together with Samsong [Samsung] Precision, Korean Airlines succeeded in manufacturing the first F-5F fighter plane, which was named "Chegong-ho [Air Superiority]," in September 1982.

About 20 percent of the manufacturing has been localized and the cost per plane is somewhat high, about 130 percent of the Northrop price. This is, however, an epoch-making event when compared to other developing countries in which airplane production costs amount to about 200 percent of the original unit price.

Korean Airlines established the Aeronautical Engineering Laboratory in May 1978 to develop its own airplanes.

This laboratory hired a total of 52 engineers, including 12 PhD's, and they are working on the design, research and development of a trainer as well as on domestic production of aircraft parts.

According to T'ae Hong Kang, deputy director of project planning office of Korean Airlines, "The engineering skill of the Korean aircraft industry has reached a point where we can jointly design and manufacture aircraft with advanced countries, but we do not have any [domestic] civilian customers. To cope with this weakness, we need strong support from the government."

Deputy director Kang also stated, "We are now jointly developing a trainer with an aircraft company in Switzerland. Also, we are studying the possibility of participating in a consortium with other countries to manufacture drones, which are in demand throughout the world."

Samsong Precision has been named as the leading company in aircraft production, according to the Aircraft Industry Promotion Act. The company signed technical cooperation agreements with General Electric of the United States to manufacture jet engines for fighter planes and with Allison, a subsidiary of General Motors, to manufacture engines for combat helicopters. Samsong built a factory in April 1980 and began engine maintenance there.

The engines for F-5E and F-5F fighters manufactured by Samsong have been successfully used on "Chegong-ho" and received favorable comments.

In addition, in 1982 Samsong Precision began to maintain eight different types of jet engines for fighter planes and engines for combat helicopters. The company not only fills domestic military needs, but it has also earned about 3 million dollars a year through maintenance services to the United States and southeast Asia countries.

The company also produces some airframe parts. It has exported five types of aircraft parts, worth about 3 million dollars, to Northrop so far. Samsong also signed a contract to supply engine parts worth 600,000 dollars for Boeing 747's in July 1983. The company expects to sign another contract to provide additional parts worth 3 million dollars in July 1984.

Also, in May 1984, the company signed a contract with General Electric to supply five types of parts worth 10 million dollars.

All parts manufactured and services provided by Samsong Precision have been certified by the U. S. Federal Aviation Agency, and therefore can be used anywhere in the world.

Samsong Precision established the Aeronautical Research Institute in April 1983 with about 50 research staff members. At the institute, all aspects of aircraft, with emphasis on economic feasibility and systematization of domestic production of parts, are being studied.

Chaeil Yi, engineering division director of aircraft project office of Samsong Precision, announced, "Our capability for [aircraft] engine maintenance is very advanced. By the end of next year, we plan to maintain even the engines of F-16's, the most advanced fighter plane.

"We can assemble any kind of engine as long as we can import parts. Technically, we are ready to manufacture domestically more than 40 percent of the engine parts we are assembling now, but we plan to proceed slowly because of [poor] profitability."

On the other hand, Taeu [Daewoo] Heavy Industries signed a contract in April with General Dynamics of the U.S. to supply airframe and control system parts for 100 F-16 fighter planes and began construction of a plant.

In addition, brisk research activities are in progress at aeronautical engineering departments of universities, the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology [KAIST] and the Korean Institute of Machinery and Metallurgy [KIMM].

The Light Aircraft Manufacturing Team (team leader: Dr Kuk Chang) of KAIST received a 300-million-won grant from T'ongil [Unification] Industry and manufactured [a light plane] last May.

This project, however, was abandoned before a test flight was even made because of the lack of applicable aircraft regulations.

KIMM established an aircraft machinery laboratory and completed, in April 1984, a research project on the "Establishment of a quality assurance system for aircraft and parts," sponsored by the Science and Technology Agency as a special project.

Space Industry

The space industry being developed in Korea is concentrating on the development of satellite communication systems and securing their own communications satellite.

To achieve this goal, five companies--Samsong Semiconductor Communications,

Hyondae [Hyundai] Electronic Industries, Kumsong [Gold Star] Electric, Taeu Communications and Tongyang [Dongyang] Precision--led by the Korea Industrial Development Research Institute--contributed a total of 200 million won and in September 1983 began a study of economic feasibility and basic preparations required for owning a communications satellite.

According to the initial results of this study, which was completed in last February, the total cost of owning a communications satellite will be about 280 billion won while the satellite will generate demand for developing new media and products worth a total of 4.4 trillion won, thus leading to economically favorable conclusions.

Communication satellites are indispensable in meeting the rapidly increasing communications need. Satellites are also used in character broadcasting, digital broadcasting, voice multiplex broadcasting and high-quality TV broadcasting. Japan already owned communication satellites in the early sixties when its per capita GNP was only 457 dollars.

Moreover, Taeryung Precision and Tongnam Electric have been manufacturing and exporting satellite receivers.

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